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“The right to a fair trial is also an inconvenient right.”1  It has long been 
recognized that the right to confront, impeach, and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses in a criminal trial is the cornerstone of the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial.  Dean J.H. Wigmore explained that the right to confrontation serves a 
principal purpose: 
The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the 
opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.  The opponent 
demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the 
witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-
examination, which cannot be had except by direct and personal 
putting of questions and obtaining of immediate answers.2 
He described cross-examination as “the greatest legal engine ever invented 
for the discovery of truth.”3  More recently, Justice Hugo Black described the 
importance of cross-examination: “It is only when the witnesses are present and 
subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the weight to be given their 
testimony can be appraised.  Trial by affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury 
which so long has been the hallmark of ‘even handed justice.’” 4 
The right to confrontation has never been viewed as an absolute right.  
Although the primary goal of the adversarial trial process is to ascertain the truth, 
other important societal values, such as fairness to the parties and public 
                                                 
 1. Laura Hoyano, What Is Balanced on the Scales of Justice?  In Search of the Essence of 
the Right to a Fair Trial, 1 CRIM. L. REV. 4, 28 (2014) (Eng.). 
 2. 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1395 (2d ed. 1923).  Much of this discussion that follows 
is from the Author’s previous article, Deborah Paruch, Silencing the Victims in Sexual Abuse 
Prosecutions: The Confrontation Clause and Children’s Hearsay Statements Before and After 
Michigan v. Bryant, 28 TOURO L. REV. 85 (2012). 
 3. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1972), quoted in RONALD 
JOSEPH DELISLE ET AL., EVIDENCE PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS 533 (11th ed. 2015) (Can.). 
 4. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 176 (1970) (Black, J., concurring) (quoting 
Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962)); see also Mark S. Brodin, The 
British Experience with Hearsay Reform: A Cautionary Tale, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1417, 1426–
27 (2016) (cautioning about the detrimental consequences that emerged when the United Kingdom 
loosened its requirements of cross-examination); Bruce P. Archibald, The Canadian Hearsay 
Revolution: Is Half a Loaf Better Than No Loaf at All?, 25 QUEEN’S L.J. 1, 6–9 (1999) (Can.) 
(noting the importance of cross-examination in the Canadian legal system). 
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confidence in the integrity of the process, are at stake.5  As a result of these 
competing values, there is significant controversy surrounding the admission of 
hearsay in criminal trials.6  The controversy centers on when hearsay aids the 
truth-seeking process, when it impedes the process, and how it affects other 
values at stake.7 
The operation of the hearsay rule, specifically as it relates to the right of 
accused persons to confront a witness against them, has undergone substantial 
development and change, received significant academic attention, and generated 
significant debate in the past few decades in the United States, Canada, and 
Europe.8  The result has been three markedly diverse legal doctrines.  The U.S. 
confrontation clause jurisprudence focuses its attention on the nature of the 
hearsay statement and whether the statement is a “testimonial statement.”9  
Under this doctrine, the key inquiry is whether the declarant or the interrogator 
intended the statements to be the equivalent of testimony at time they were 
made.10  If so, the statements are not admissible at trial unless it is shown that 
the declarant is unavailable and there has been a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.11  Canadian courts, on the other hand, crafted what is known as the 
principled approach.12  Under this doctrine, hearsay is admitted in criminal trials 
provided it is shown to be both necessary and reliable.13  Finally, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has held that untested hearsay statements 
found to be the sole or decisive evidence against a defendant in a criminal trial 
should not be admitted unless sufficient counterbalancing factors are present to 
compensate for the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the admission of 
this untested evidence.14 
Part I of this Article sets out a short discussion of the history of the right to 
confrontation.  Part II contains a detailed discussion of the treatment of hearsay 
in criminal trials in the United States, Canada, and the ECtHR.  It shows the 
                                                 
 5. See Archibald, supra note 4, at 7–9. 
 6. Id. at 7–8 (“Much controversy over the hearsay rules, of course, is centered on questions 
of when they help and when they hinder truth-finding.”). 
 7. Id. at 7–10. 
 8. The Author has not examined the individual countries in Europe, rather focuses on the 
European Court of Human Rights decisions. 
 9. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821–22 (2006). 
 10. See, e.g., id. at 822 (“[Statements] are testimonial when . . . the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”). 
 11. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
 12. See, e.g., Nicholas Bala, Canada’s Empirically-Based Child Competency Test and Its 
Principled Approach to Hearsay, 19 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 513, 533–39 (2014) (Can.) 
(“Under this ‘principled’ approach, hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible, and the onus 
is on the Crown to establish the statement’s admissibility as reliable and necessary.”). 
 13. See, e.g., R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, 546 (Can.) (“[T]he reception of hearsay 
evidence in this case is justified on grounds of necessity and reliability.”). 
 14. Al-Khawaja v. United Kingdom, 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 191, 253 (“The question . . . is 
whether there are sufficient counterbalancing factors in place, including measures that permit a fair 
and proper assessment of the reliability of that evidence to take place.”). 
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evolution of the doctrine within each jurisdiction and includes commentary from 
scholars and courts identifying the strengths and weaknesses of each approach.  
Part III begins with a comparative analysis of the doctrines from these 
jurisdictions.  The Author moves on to analyze and predict how the key cases 
from each jurisdiction would likely be decided by each of the other two 
jurisdictions, illustrating the markedly different outcomes that would likely 
occur.  Finally, the Author identifies lessons that the U.S. Supreme Court could 
learn from Canada and the ECtHR, and argues that the Supreme Court should 
adopt a modified version of the doctrine established by the ECtHR to best protect 
a defendant’s right to a fair trial while also serving the other competing values 
at play in criminal trials. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION 
An accused’s right to confrontation has its origins in Roman law15 and the 
common law of England.16  In the common law of England, the development of 
“the hearsay rule, as a distinct and living idea,” did not begin until the sixteenth 
century and did not reach full development until the early eighteenth century.17  
The process of obtaining information from persons who were not called as 
witnesses was common practice in trials in England during the fifteenth 
century.18  In fact, it was standard practice for jurors to confer privately with 
witnesses outside of court, where the witnesses would “inform” the juror.19  This 
practice was described by Chief Justice Fortescue in 1450, “[i]f the jurors come 
to a man where he lives, in the country, to have knowledge of the truth of the 
matter, and he informs them, it is justifiable.”20  Jurors may have been provided 
with a “counsel’s report” that documented what a witness might have said or 
predicted what the witness would likely say about the matter before the court.21  
During this time, there was little to no objection to the use of these types of out-
of-court statements at trial.22 
                                                 
 15. Similar to the United States, Roman criminal procedure was accusatorial in nature.  The 
accusing individual, the “accusator,” was responsible for prosecuting the defendant and had the 
burden of proving the charge.  Witness testimony was the principal evidence.  The accusator was 
required to be present in court to state the charge.  Defendants were also entitled to be present.  
There was a preference for testimony of witnesses in court where they were subject to cross 
examination.  Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and 
Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 481, 484–89 (1994). 
 16. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (“The [English] common-law tradition 
is one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing . . . .”). 
 17. John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437, 437 (1904). 
 18. Id. at 438–39. 
 19. Id. at 440. 
 20. Id. (quoting YB 28 Hen. 6, fol. 6, Pasch, pl. 1 (1450) (Eng.), as translated in JAMES 
BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 129 (1898)). 
 21. Id. at 441. 
 22. Id. at 440–41.  Actually, the process of producing fact witnesses at trial was discouraged.  
Compulsory process for witnesses was not provided until 1562–1563.  Id. 
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During the seventeenth century, juries came to depend, with increased 
frequency, on in-court testimony as their chief source of information.23  At this 
time, a sense of impropriety developed around the use of out-of-court statements 
based principally on the notion that these statements should be admitted only if 
the person affected by them had an opportunity to test their trustworthiness by 
means of cross-examination.24  During this time, considerable thought was being 
given to the quantity and reliability of the evidence that would allow jurors to 
reach a correct decision.  Statutes and other rules were passed that addressed 
topics such as “good and sufficient” or “good and lawful” proofs.25  As a result 
of these transformations, courts began to question “whether a hearsay thus laid 
before [a jury] would suffice.”26  They began to challenge the validity of verdicts 
where the evidence presented at trial consisted solely of hearsay.27 
Many accounts of the history of the right to confrontation cite the infamous 
prosecution of Sir Walter Raleigh for treason in 1603.28  The most damaging 
evidence presented by the prosecution was a statement Lord Cobham gave 
during an interrogation conducted in the Tower of London in which he alleged 
that Raleigh was the instigator of the plan to overthrow the King.29  During the 
trial, records of this interrogation were read to the jury.30  Raleigh denied the 
charges and demanded that the court call Cobham to appear at trial.31  The court 
denied his request, convicted him, and sentenced him to death.32 
                                                 
 23. Id. at 441. 
 24. See id. at 448. 
 25. Id. at 441–42. 
 26. Id. at 442. 
 27. Id. at 442–43.  For example, a discussion was raised whether the requirement for a 
conviction for treason, which required evidence from two accusers, could be satisfied if one was 
by hearsay.  Id.; see also R. v. Thomas (1553) 73 Eng. Rep. 218, 218–19 (K.B.) (“[I]t was there 
holden for law, that of two accusors, if one be an accusor of his own knowledge, or of his own 
hearing, and he relate it to another, the other may well be an accusor . . . .”). 
 28. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004).  Raleigh was charged with 
conspiring against King James by raising money abroad to distribute to rebels with the objective of 
having Arabella Stuart placed on the throne.  See Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its 
History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB. L. 381, 388 (1959). 
 29. Jacqueline Forsgren Cronkhite, Comment, Signed, Sealed, Delivered . . . 
Unconstitutional: The Effect of Melendez-Diaz on the Use of Notarized Crime Laboratory Reports 
in Arkansas, 63 ARK. L. REV. 757, 761 (2010). 
 30. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. 
 31. Id.  For a transcript of Sir Raleigh’s trial, see 1 DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 400 
(1832). 
 32. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.  It is reported that one of the judges responding to Raleigh’s 
request stated: “[M]any horse-stealers may escape, if they may not be condemned without 
witnesses.”  Miller v. Indiana, 517 N.E.2d 64, 67 (Ind. 1987) (quoting Kenneth W. Graham, The 
Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 99, 100 (1972)). 
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During the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, courts began to question 
the practice of freely admitting hearsay.33  At this time however, the law 
distinguished hearsay statements made under oath from those that were not.34  
As such, it was common practice to have a sworn statement read aloud to the 
jury and for the deponent to confirm it by indicating that it was freely and 
voluntarily made.35  By the end of the seventeenth century, this practice of 
admitting sworn extrajudicial statements was abandoned in favor of one that 
required the testimony of the witness in court.36  Two trials decided in 1696, R. 
v. Paine37 and Fenwick’s Trial,38 appear to have solidified the rule that hearsay 
statements, including those given under oath, should not be admitted if there was 
no prior opportunity for cross-examination.  In Paine, the declarant gave a 
deposition under oath in front of the Mayor of Bristol but died before the trial.39  
The King’s Bench remarked, “these depositions should not be given in evidence, 
the defendant not being present when they were taken before the mayor, and so 
had lost the benefit of a cross-examination.”40 
II.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES, CANADA, AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
A.  The United States’ Jurisprudence 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
provides, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”41 
In criminal trials, the question of whether hearsay is admissible involves two 
distinct legal issues: first, whether the out-of-court statements are admissible 
under the established evidentiary rules; and second, whether the admission of 
hearsay statements violates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.  
In California v. Green,42 the U.S. Supreme Court noted: 
                                                 
 33. See Wigmore, supra note 17, at 441–42. 
 34. See id. at 447–48, 450–51. 
 35. Id. at 451. 
 36. Id. at 451–52, 454–56. 
 37. R. v. Paine (1696) 87 Eng. Rep. 584, 585 (K.B.). 
 38. Fenwick’s Trial (1696) 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 596 (Eng.) (proceedings in the House of 
Commons). 
 39. Paine, 87 Eng. Rep. at 584. 
 40. Id. at 585. 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The Amendment was proposed to Congress in 1789 and adopted 
in 1791.  See H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 85–88 (1789); see also Steve Mount, Ratification 
of Constitutional Amendments, USCONSTITUTION.NET, http://www.usconstitution.net/constamrat. 
html (last modified Nov. 11, 2010) (stating the dates that states ratified the Bill of Rights; Virginia 
was the eleventh state to ratify on December 15, 1791, providing the required majority of eleven 
out of fourteen states). 
 42. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
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[W]e have more than once found a violation of confrontation values 
even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably 
recognized hearsay exception.  The converse is equally true: merely 
because evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay 
rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights 
have been denied.43 
1.  Ohio v. Roberts 
The discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court’s modern Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence begins with its 1980 opinion in Ohio v. Roberts.44  The issue 
before the Court was whether an unavailable declarant’s preliminary hearing 
testimony, obtained without cross-examination, could be admitted in a 
subsequent criminal trial on the same matter.45  In this case, the defendant was 
arrested and charged with forging checks and possession of stolen credit cards 
belonging to the parents of the declarant, Anita Isaacs.  At the preliminary 
hearing, defendant’s attorney called Isaacs to the stand.46  Although he tried to 
get her to admit that she had given defendant the checks and credit cards, she 
denied doing so.  He did not request to treat her as a hostile witness and the 
prosecutor did not question her.47 
Isaacs was unavailable to testify at the trial.48  The defendant took the stand 
and testified that she had given him the credit cards and checks.49  The trial court 
admitted the transcript of Isaac’s testimony at the preliminary hearing over 
defendant’s objections.50  The jury convicted the defendant on all counts.51 
The Supreme Court began its discussion by noting that although the 
Confrontation Clause prefers “face-to-face confrontation at trial,” this right is 
                                                 
 43. Id. at 155–56 (first citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); and then citing Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)). 
 44. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).  For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s early decisions addressing 
the right to confrontation, see Brief for Petitioner at 18–21, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21939940.  See also Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a 
Stable Foundation for Confrontation Doctrine?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 49–50 (2005). 
 45. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 59 (“Between November 1975 and March 1976, five subpoenas . . . were issued to 
Anita at her parents’ Ohio residence.  The last three carried a written instruction that Anita should 
‘call before appearing.’ . . . She did not telephone and she did not appear at trial.”). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 59–60.  The prosecution relied on an Ohio statute that permitted “the use of 
preliminary examination testimony of a witness who ‘cannot for any reason be produced at the 
trial.’”  Id. at 59 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.49 (West 1975)).  The trial court conducted 
a voir dire hearing in response to the defendant’s objections.  Amy Isaacs, Anita’s mother, was the 
only witness at voir dire.  Upon her testimony in which she stated that she had no way to reach her 
daughter, the court admitted the transcript into evidence.  Id. at 59–60. 
 51. Id. at 60. 
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not absolute.52  It stated that “general rules of law of this kind, however 
beneficent in their operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give 
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.”53 
The Court explained that the Confrontation Clause operates in two distinct 
ways to restrict the scope of admissible hearsay.  First, a rule of necessity is 
implicit in the Sixth Amendment, which requires that the hearsay declarant be 
unavailable at trial.54  Second, the Confrontation Clause only allows the 
admission of hearsay evidence that is found to be trustworthy—statements must 
bear adequate “indicia of reliability.”55  The Court concluded that Anita Isaacs’ 
preliminary examination testimony bore sufficient “indicia of reliability” 
because defendant’s attorney was able to challenge her testimony at the 
preliminary hearing with the “equivalent of significant cross-examination.”56 
The approach set forth in Roberts was strongly criticized, and it was not long 
before scholars and several justices of the Supreme Court began to advocate for 
its replacement.57  Criticism of the Roberts test centered on several grounds: the 
test was criticized for being at odds with the history, purpose, text, and structure 
of the Confrontation Clause;58 for “robbing the confrontation right of any 
                                                 
 52. Id. at 63. 
 53. Id. at 64 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 259–60 (1895) (Shiras, J., 
dissenting)). 
 54. Id. at 65. 
 55. Id. at 65–66 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972)).  The Court also stated 
that reliability could be inferred where the statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.  
If not, then it may still be admitted upon “a showing of particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”  Id. 
 56. Id. at 70–73. 
 57. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST 
PRINCIPLES 125–31, 126 nn.168–70 (Yale U. Press ed. 1997); Margaret A. Berger, The 
Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint 
Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 594 (1992); Joshua C. Dickinson, The Confrontation Clause and the 
Hearsay Rule: The Current State of a Failed Marriage in Need of a Quick Divorce, 33 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 763, 780–82 (2000); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 
86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1015–18 (1998). 
 58. See AMAR, supra note 57, at 125–31, 126 nn.168–70 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. 56) 
(“Though the text and purposes of the confrontation clause seem clear enough, modern Supreme 
Court case law on the clause is surprisingly muddled in logic and exposition.”). 
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independent substance”;59 and for introducing unnecessary inconsistency and 
confusion into this area of the law.60 
2.  Crawford v. Washington 
The Court overruled Ohio v. Roberts some twenty years later in Crawford v. 
Washington.61  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the State of 
Washington’s use of a tape-recorded statement obtained by police during an 
interrogation of the defendant’s wife in the defendant’s trial for assault and 
attempted murder violated the Confrontation Clause.62  The facts of the case are 
as follows.   
Michael Crawford and his wife Sylvia were involved in an altercation with 
Kenneth Lee “in which Lee was stabbed in the torso and [Michael’s] hand was 
cut.”63  Michael and Sylvia were arrested and separately interrogated by the 
police.  Their accounts of the events leading up to the assault differed as to 
whether Lee had actually drawn a weapon before Michael assaulted him.64  
Michael was subsequently charged with stabbing Lee and claimed self-defense.  
No charges were filed against Sylvia.65 
Sylvia was unavailable to testify on the grounds of a state marital privilege.  
In her absence, the prosecution sought to introduce her statements to the police 
in order to challenge Michael’s claims of self-defense.66  The trial court, 
following Roberts, admitted the statements into evidence on the grounds that the 
statements bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”67  The jury 
convicted Michael of assault and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed.68 
Justice Scalia began his opinion with a lengthy discussion of the history of the 
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and suggested that history permits 
two inferences about its meaning.69  First, the Confrontation Clause was 
                                                 
 59. Thomas Y. Davies, Not “The Framers’ Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban Against 
Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the 
Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 359 n.26 (2007) (first citing Randolph N. 
Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 574–
75 (1988); and then citing David E. Seidelson, The Confrontation Clause, the Right Against Self-
Incrimination and the Supreme Court: A Critique and Some Modest Proposals, 20 DUQ. L. REV. 
429, 433 (1982)). 
 60. See Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
1171, 1208 (2002); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative 
History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 167–68 (1995). 
 61. 541 U.S. 36, 67–69 (2004). 
 62. Id. at 40, 68–69. 
 63. Id. at 38. 
 64. Id. at 39, 41–42. 
 65. Id. at 40. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)). 
 68. Id. at 41–42. 
 69. Id. at 50. 
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specifically directed at the use of ex parte examinations as evidence in criminal 
proceedings against the accused, and second, the Framers would not have 
allowed the admission of testimonial statements of an unavailable witness unless 
the defendant was previously afforded an opportunity for cross-examination.70 
He criticized Roberts on the grounds that conditioning the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence on “whether it falls under a ‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’ 
or bears ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’” is in conflict with the 
original meaning of the Confrontation Clause, principally because it allows a 
jury to hear evidence that can include statements, which are in fact ex parte 
testimony, upon a simple judicial determination of reliability.71  He noted, 
“[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin 
to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.  This is not 
what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”72 
Based on this, Justice Scalia opined that the confrontation right applies to 
witnesses, which he defined as “those who ‘bear testimony.’”73  He defined 
testimony as “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact.”74  Although he refused to comprehensively 
define which statements would trigger constitutional protections, he 
acknowledged that “[v]arious formulations of this core class of ‘testimonial’ 
statements exist,” including out-of-court statements “made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement 
would be available for use at a later trial.”75  He further added, “[w]hatever else 
the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary 
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.”76  
In closing, he stated that “[w]here testimonial evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth 
                                                 
 70. Id. at 53–54. 
 71. Id. at 60 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). 
 72. Id. at 62.  He also stated: 
Involvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward 
trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out time and again 
throughout a history with which the Framers were keenly familiar.  This consideration 
does not evaporate when testimony happens to fall within some broad, modern hearsay 
exception, even if that exception might be justifiable in other circumstances. 
Id. at 56 n.7. 
 73. Id. at 51 (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (1828)). 
 74. Id. at 68 (alteration in original). 
 75. Id. at 51–52 (quoting Brief for Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410)). 
 76. Id. at 68.  There is much disagreement with Justice Scalia’s interpretation.  See, e.g., David 
L. Noll, Constitutional Evasion and the Confrontation Puzzle, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1899, 1905–06 
(2015) (referring to the Crawford Court’s approach to the Confrontation Clause as “missteps [that] 
led to the doctrinal breakdown that continues to this day”); Friedman, supra note 57, at 1025–26; 
Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for Confrontation Doctrine?, supra note 44, at 
86–87. 
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Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.”77 
3.  Davis v. Washington 
One year after its decision in Crawford v. Washington, the Court granted 
certiorari in Davis v. Washington.78  In this case, the Court further expanded the 
definition of testimonial statements and introduced what is now known as the 
primary purpose test.  This case involved two consolidated domestic violence 
cases: Davis v. Washington79 and Hammon v. Indiana.80  In Davis, Michelle 
McCottry made a 911 emergency call during a domestic dispute with her 
boyfriend, Adrian Davis.81  During the call she identified Davis as the 
perpetrator.82  While she was speaking to the operator, Davis left the house and 
drove away in his car.  The police arrived approximately four minutes later, 
finding McCottry in a “shaken state” with injuries on her forearm and face.83  
Davis was charged with a felony violation of a no-contact order.  McCottry did 
not appear at trial and the trial court, over Davis’ objections, admitted the 
recording of McCottry’s 911 call.84 
In Hammon v. Indiana, police officers responded to a domestic disturbance 
report at the home of Hershel and Amy Hammon.85  When they arrived, they 
found Amy on the front porch alone.  Although she appeared frightened, she told 
them that nothing was wrong.86  When they entered the house, they found 
Hershel in the kitchen.  He told the officers that he and his wife had been fighting 
but that “everything was fine now.”87  The officers separated Amy and Hershel 
and after Amy presented her side of the story, officers had her handwrite her 
statement in a “battery affidavit.”88  Herschel was charged with domestic battery.  
Amy was subpoenaed but did not appear at trial.  In her absence, the trial court 
allowed the officers to testify as to the statements she made and granted the 
prosecution’s motion to admit her affidavit into evidence.89 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority and citing Crawford, noted that 
testimonial statements include “[s]tatements taken by police officers in the 
                                                 
 77. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 78. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), cert. granted, 546 U.S. 975 (2005). 
 79. 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005). 
 80. 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005). 
 81. Davis, 547 U.S. at 817. 
 82. Id. at 818. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 818–19. 
 85. Id. at 819. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 820. 
 89. Id. 
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course of interrogations.”90  However, he excepted police interrogations that 
occur in emergency situations, stating: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.91 
He emphasized that the focus of the inquiry is on the declarant, stating, “it is 
in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, 
that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.”92 
In applying these rules to the cases before it, the Court found that the 
statements made during the 911 call in Davis were not testimonial because the 
statements described events as they were occurring and the information elicited 
in response to the questions asked by the interrogator was necessary for the 
police to be able to respond to the present emergency.93  By contrast, the Court 
found that Amy Hammon’s statements to the police were testimonial because 
her statements were made some time after the emergency had ended and 
recounted only past events.94 
4.  Michigan v. Bryant 
The Court altered the parameters of the primary purpose test it established in 
Davis five years later in Michigan v. Bryant.95  The facts are as follows.  In the 
early morning hours of April 29, 2001, Detroit police officers responded to a 
radio dispatch indicating a man had been shot.96  They found the decedent, 
Anthony Covington, lying on the ground next to his car in the parking lot of a 
gas station.  The officers noticed he had a gunshot wound to his abdomen, 
appeared to be in great pain, and was having difficulty speaking.97  He told the 
police that a man named Rick had shot him about a half hour earlier as he was 
                                                 
 90. Id. at 822 (alteration in original) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 
(2004)). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 822 n.1. 
 93. Id. at 827–28. 
 94. Id. at 831–32.  Respondents for both cases argued the need for greater flexibility in the 
use of hearsay testimony in cases of domestic abuse because these crimes are “notoriously 
susceptible” to intimidation of the victims by their assailants to assure that they do not testify.  
Although the Court expressed its sympathy to the plight of these victims, it rejected the argument, 
noting: “We may not . . . vitiate constitutional guarantees when they have the effect of allowing the 
guilty to go free.”  Id. at 832–33. 
 95. 562 U.S. 344 (2011). 
 96. Id. at 349. 
 97. Id. 
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leaving Rick’s house.  After being shot, he fled Rick’s house in his car, driving 
to the gas station where the police found him.98  The police interrogation lasted 
approximately five to ten minutes and ended when emergency medical personnel 
arrived at the scene.  Covington was taken to a local hospital where he died a 
few hours later.99  Bryant was arrested in California approximately one year later 
and returned to Michigan where he was tried for murder.100 
The trial court admitted the statements that Covington made to the police at 
the gas station.101  Bryant was convicted of second-degree murder; however, the 
Supreme Court of Michigan reversed his conviction.102  Citing Davis, the Court 
found that Covington’s statements to the police were inadmissible on the 
grounds that they were testimonial hearsay.103 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the 
Michigan Supreme Court and remanded the case, this time with Justice 
Sotomayor authoring the majority opinion.104  Returning to the primary purpose 
test it set out in Davis, the Court noted that the existence of an ongoing 
emergency is one of the most important indicators in determining the primary 
purpose of an interrogation.  This is because an ongoing emergency focuses the 
individuals involved on resolving an active threat rather than “proving past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”105  The Court 
explained that determining the primary purpose of an interrogation and whether 
an emergency exists is a fact-dependent inquiry that depends on a variety of 
factors including: the type and scope of danger to the police, victim, and public 
at large; the type of weapon involved; the victim’s medical condition; and the 
statements and actions of all of the individuals involved.106 
                                                 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  There is a significant discrepancy as to the actions of the police at this point in time.  
The majority opinion suggests that the police immediately called for backup and traveled to 
Bryant’s house.  Id.  However, the dissent claims that it took the police approximately two and a 
half hours before they had “secured the scene of the shooting.”  Id. at 388.  Nonetheless, when the 
police went to the defendant’s house, they found a bullet hole in the back door along with 
Covington’s wallet and identification.  Id. at 350. 
 100. Id. at 374. 
 101. Id. at 350. 
 102. Id.  Although the Michigan Supreme Court ultimately reversed his conviction, the case 
was previously remanded to the Michigan Court of Appeals to be reconsidered in light of the Davis 
decision, which was decided after the court affirmed the conviction.  Once again, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Covington’s statements to police were not 
testimonial.  Id. 
 103. Id. at 351. 
 104. Id. at 378. 
 105. Id. at 361 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)). 
 106. Id. at 363–65.  The Court compared the facts in Davis to the instant case and commented 
that in domestic violence cases such as Davis and Hammon, the emergency will have a shorter 
duration than the one in the present case because domestic violence cases have a “narrower zone 
of potential victims than cases involving threats to public safety.”  Id. at 363.  A victim’s medical 
condition will be relevant because it “sheds light on the ability of the victim to have any purpose at 
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Applying these rules to the case before it, the Court concluded that there was 
an ongoing emergency at the time the police officers interrogated Covington, 
noting that crimes involving guns result in a heightened state of emergency.107  
In examining the statements and actions of the police officers, the Court found 
that they responded to a call that a man had been shot and that their questions to 
Covington focused on obtaining information about the shooting which was 
necessary to allow them to “meet an ongoing emergency.”108  The Court also 
noted that, in light of these facts, it could not reasonably say that “a person in 
Covington’s situation would have had a ‘primary purpose’ ‘to establish or prove 
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’”109  It concluded 
that the circumstances of the encounter, coupled with the statements and actions 
of Covington and the police officers, demonstrated that Covington’s statements 
were not testimonial because the primary purpose of the interrogation was to 
enable the police to respond to an ongoing emergency.110 
5.  Ohio v. Clark 
The Supreme Court’s most recent decision in this area of the law is Ohio v. 
Clark, a 2015 decision that involved the physical abuse of a young boy and the 
statements he made to a teacher in which he identified his mother’s live-in 
boyfriend as his abuser.111  At the time of the incident, the defendant, Darius 
Clark lived with his girlfriend, Tahiem T., her eighteen-month-old daughter, 
A.T., and her three-and-a-half-year-old son, L.P.112  Tahiem had a long history 
with the Cuyahoga County Department of Child and Family Services.  Her 
                                                 
all in responding to police questions and on the likelihood that any purpose formed would 
necessarily be a testimonial one.”  Id. at 364–65. 
 107. Id. at 373–74. 
 108. Id. at 376 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). 
 109. Id. at 375 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). 
 110. Id. at 377–78.  The Court, without explanation, and in dicta, reintroduced the concept of 
reliability, which has been absent from its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence since its decision in 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).  Id. at 353.  It noted that in determining the primary purpose 
of an interrogation, “standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, 
will be relevant.”  Id. at 358–59.  Justice Scalia delivered a scathing dissent, accusing the majority 
of “distor[ting] our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leav[ing] it in a shambles.”  Id. at 380. 
He disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of facts, stating: 
Today’s tale—a story of five officers conducting successive examinations of a dying man 
with the primary purpose, not of obtaining and preserving his testimony regarding his 
killer, but of protecting him, them, and others from a murderer somewhere on the loose—
is so transparently false that professing to believe it demeans this institution. 
Id. at 379. 
 111. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015). 
 112. Id. at 2177. 
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parental rights to three older children had been terminated due to abuse and 
neglect and her drug abuse.113 
Tahiem picked her son up from preschool on the afternoon of March 16, 2010.  
At that time, he had no observable injuries.  She was with L.P. until 
approximately midnight when she left Cleveland to engage in prostitution in 
Washington, D.C., leaving L.P. and A.T. in Clark’s care.114  The next day, L.P.’s 
preschool teachers noticed he had certain injuries, principally that one of his one 
eyes appeared bloodshot.  They also observed red marks on his face. When he 
was asked what happened to him, he initially said nothing; later, he said he 
fell.115  He finally named Clark but only after prolonged questioning.116 
The school contacted the Department of Child and Family Services, which 
then sent a social worker to the school to question L.P.  At first, L.P. told the 
worker that he had fallen.  However, after further questioning, L.P. indicated 
that “the bruises came from [Clark].”117  Clark arrived at the school while the 
social worker was questioning L.P.118  He denied responsibility for L.P.’s 
injuries and abruptly left with L.P.119  The next day a social worker found A.T. 
and L.P. at Clark’s mother’s house, under the care of teenagers.120  After 
observing injuries to both young children, she took them to the hospital where 
the doctors found multiple injuries to both children.121 
Clark was arrested and charged with numerous counts of felonious assault and 
child endangerment.122  The central issue at trial was whether Clark or Tahiem 
                                                 
 113. Brief for Respondent at 8–9, Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015) (No. 13-1352) 
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent] (noting there was also evidence that she continued to physically 
abuse her two younger children). 
 114. Id. at 9. 
 115. Id. at 9–10.  Another teacher pulled him aside asking: “Who did this?  What happened to 
you?  [D]id [you] get a spanking?”  Id. at 11 (alteration in original). 
 116. In describing his response to the questioning, the teacher commented that she thought he 
appeared “bewildered.”  When asked what she meant by “bewildered,” she elaborated: “Out.  
Staring out.  And I was asking him—he almost looked uncertain, but he said, ‘Dee.’”  Joint 
Appendix at 61, Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015) (No. 13-1352), 2014 WL 6468981 
[hereinafter Joint Appendix].  On cross-examination, the teacher acknowledged that she was not 
sure whether L.P. understood what was being asked of him.  Id. at 82. 
 117. Brief for Respondent, supra note 113, at 12. 
 118. Joint Appendix, supra note 116, at 147. 
 119. The social worker testified that Clark left abruptly, before the worker could finish his 
questioning.  Although he attempted to stop Clark from leaving, the confrontation ended at a “stare-
down” between Clark and himself because he “didn’t want to get into a physical altercation.”  Id. 
at 150–51. 
 120. Id. at 99–100. 
 121. Brief for Respondent, supra note 113, at 12–13.  When a social worker contacted Tahiem 
by phone to relay her concerns about the children, Tahiem accused the teachers of lying.  She also 
told the worker that she was with the children and “was about to take L.P. for treatment for pink 
eye”—even though she was in Washington at the time.  Id. at 12.  After being told about the 
physician’s findings and L.P.’s allegations, Tahiem decided to remain in Washington.  In fact, not 
until her extradition five months later did she return to Ohio.  Id. at 14. 
 122. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2178 (2015). 
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caused the children’s injuries.123  Over defense counsel’s objections, the court 
allowed the teachers to testify to the statements L.P. made to them as evidence 
of Clark’s guilt.124  In closing arguments, the prosecutor repeatedly told the jury 
to focus on L.P.’s hearsay statements in determining Clark’s guilt.125  Clark was 
convicted and sentenced to twenty-eight years in prison.  The Ohio Supreme 
Court affirmed the reversal of the court of appeals, finding that L.P.’s statements 
were testimonial in nature.126 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the 
Ohio Supreme Court.  Justice Alito, writing for the Court, found that L.P.’s 
statements were not testimonial because they were made during an ongoing 
emergency—one in which a young child was found to be a victim of physical 
abuse.127  He noted that the teachers needed to determine how L.P. incurred his 
injuries and the identity of the abuser.  He compared the situation to the 911 call 
in Davis and the situation in Bryant, commenting that “the emergency in this 
case was ongoing, and the circumstances were not entirely clear.”128  He also 
distinguished the present circumstances from those in Hammon, because in that 
case “the police knew the identity of the assailant and questioned the victim after 
shielding her from potential harm.”129 
The majority adopted the rationale of many of the lower courts that found a 
young child’s statements could not be testimonial in nature because a young 
child would be incapable of understanding that his or her statements could be 
used as a substitute for live testimony at trial.130  The Court rejected defendant’s 
                                                 
 123. Brief for Respondent, supra note 113, at 15. 
 124. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2178.  The court found L.P. was not competent to testify.  At a 
competency hearing, which was held before Clark’s trial, L.P., four years old by that time, was 
unresponsive to questioning.  He was unable to state his age, where he went to school, his birthday, 
his sister’s age, or who he lived with.  As a result, the court found him incompetent to testify.  For 
a transcript of L.P.’s competency hearing, see Joint Appendix, supra note 116, at 4–12. 
 125. Brief for Respondent, supra note 113, at 15. 
 126. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2178.  Applying the primary purpose test, the court found L.P.’s 
statements to the teachers to be testimonial because the teachers were acting pursuant to their duty 
to investigate and report suspected child abuse.  State v. Clark, 999 N.E.2d 592, 600 (Ohio 2013).  
The court found no ongoing emergency at the time L.P. was questioned because he did not complain 
of his injuries and did not need emergency medical care.  It noted: 
Thus, the primary purpose of that inquiry was not to extricate the child from an 
emergency situation or to obtain urgently needed medical attention, but rather was an 
information-seeking process to determine what had occurred in the past and who had 
perpetrated the abuse, establishing past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution. 
Id. 
 127. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181–83. 
 128. Id. at 2181. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 2182 (“On the contrary, a young child in these circumstances would simply want 
the abuse to end, would want to protect other victims, or would have no discernable purpose at 
all.”); see also Paruch, supra note 2, at 121 (identifying cases in which courts have adopted this 
approach). 
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argument that L.P.’s statements were testimonial because the teachers, who were 
obligated to investigate and report suspected cases of abuse under Ohio’s 
mandatory reporting laws, were functioning as an arm of the police.131  Rather, 
it stated, “mandatory reporting statutes alone cannot convert a conversation 
between a concerned teacher and her student into a law enforcement mission . . 
. .”132 
6.  Commentary on U.S. Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court’s Crawford jurisprudence has come under significant 
criticism in recent years.  Scholars are critical of Justice Scalia’s interpretation 
of the history of the Confrontation Clause and the theoretical underpinning for 
the testimonial approach he set out in Crawford.133  Professor Thomas Davies 
                                                 
 131. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182–83. 
 132. Id. at 2183.  Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, criticized Alito for his 
reintroduction of the Ohio v. Roberts’ “indicia of reliability” test overruled by Crawford, referring 
to it as “that flabbly test” loved by prosecutors, past and present.  Id. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring 
in the judgment).  There is another line of Confrontation Clause cases dealing with laboratory 
reports that have been omitted from this discussion.  See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 
U.S. 305, 308–10 (2009) (holding that laboratory analysts’ certificates indicating a substance seized 
from the defendant was cocaine were testimonial); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 664–
65 (2011) (holding that an analysts’ report containing defendant’s blood alcohol level was 
testimonial); Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 56 (2012) (plurality opinion) (dealing with reports 
containing DNA analyses).  At the time it was issued, Williams appeared to end any doctrinal 
stability among the members of the Court.  The concurring justices disagreed over whether a 
particular laboratory report was hearsay since it had not been admitted into evidence.  They also 
disagreed as to whether the report itself was a testimonial statement since the analysts that prepared 
the report were not aware of how it would be used. See Williams, 567 U.S. at 87–93 (Breyer, J., 
concurring); id. at 103–18 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).  Four justices dissented, finding 
that the Court’s prior holdings in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming controlled.  Id. at 134–40 (Kagan, 
J., dissenting).  As a result of these divergent opinions, there was no rule of law from Williams. 
 133. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or 
Are They Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 13 (2011) (“Justice 
Scalia—who allows for departures from the original understanding on the basis of precedent, 
justiciability, and settled historical practice—is not really an originalist at all.” (citing Randy E. 
Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 13 
(2006))); see also Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The 
Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 200–04 
(2005) (“What is most impressive about Crawford is how its skillful blend of originalism and 
formalism persuaded seven members of the Court to throw out decades of precedent.”).  Many 
discussions of the history of the Confrontation Clause begin by noting that history provides scant 
guidance in interpreting it.  Justice Harlan concurring in California v. Green noted: 
As the Court’s opinion suggests, the Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded 
parchment.  History seems to give us very little insight into the intended scope of the 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. 
. . . . 
From the scant information available[,] it may tentatively b[e] concluded that the 
Confrontation Clause was meant to constitutionalize a barrier against flagrant abuses, 
trials by anonymous accusers, and absentee witnesses. 
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argues that Crawford’s claim that the right of confrontation at the time of the 
framing was limited to testimonial hearsay is wrong.134  He contends that neither 
the text of the Sixth Amendment nor its historical meaning compel Crawford’s 
testimonial rule.135  He rests his opinion on the fact that during the framing era, 
out-of-court statements, including the type contained in 911 calls, criminal 
investigation reports, and forensic tests, were not admitted as evidence in 
criminal trials.136 
Professor Mike Madden disagrees with Crawford’s interpretation of the 
historical facts and text of the Confrontation Clause.137  He argues that the 
majority could have reasonably concluded that no right to cross-examine 
witnesses is protected by the Sixth Amendment.  Pointing to the ambiguity 
surrounding the term “witnesses” within the Confrontation Clause as an 
example, he highlights Justice Scalia’s acknowledgment that the phrase 
“witnesses against” could be read to apply to “those who actually testify at trial, 
those whose statements are offered at trial, or something in-between.”138 
Scholars have also criticized the Court’s primary purpose test and its focus on 
the “ongoing emergency” situation.  They argue that it is unrealistic to require 
that a court determine a singular reason for the statements or the interrogation 
because the same statements that are used to help resolve an ongoing emergency 
can later be used to convict a defendant at trial.139  Professor Jeffrey Fisher has 
                                                 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173–74, 179 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Jeffrey 
Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1865, 1881 (2012) 
(disagreeing with the Court’s approach as a matter of textual and historical analysis). 
 134. Davies, supra note 59, at 351–52; see also David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 
2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 53–54 (“What matters fundamentally is what the Confrontation Clause 
meant to the people who framed and adopted it.”). 
 135. Davies, supra note 59, at 369–71. 
 136. Id. at 366–67.  Professor Davies demonstrates through a review of the legal sources at the 
time of the framing that only sworn or functionally sworn statements made by unavailable witnesses 
could be admitted in a criminal trial as evidence of defendant’s guilt.  Id. at 383.  He notes that the 
only exceptions to this rule were the use of prior out-of-court statements that could be used to 
corroborate or impeach a witness’s trial testimony, and the use of hearsay to establish background 
facts that did not establish defendant’s guilt, such as proving the existence of a conspiracy.  Id. at 
462.  The author also reviewed pre-framing treatises and manuals and found that they identified 
two kinds of out-of-court statements that were admitted in criminal trials as evidence of defendant’s 
guilt—a sworn Marian examination of an unavailable witness and a dying declaration of a murder 
victim.  Id. at 387, 391.  These conclusions are supported by Chief Justice Marshall’s 1807 ruling 
on the inadmissibility of informal, out-of-court statements in United States v. Burr, in which he 
remarked, “I know not why . . . a man should have a constitutional claim to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him, if mere verbal declarations, made in his absence, may be evidence against 
him.”  United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694). 
 137. Mike Madden, Anchoring the Law in a Bed of Principle: A Critique of, and Proposal to 
Improve, Canadian and American Hearsay and Confrontation Law, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 395, 411–12 (2012). 
 138. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42–43 (2004)). 
 139. See, e.g., Joëlle Anne Moreno, Finding Nino: Justice Scalia’s Confrontation Clause 
Legacy from its (Glorious) Beginning to (Bitter) End, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1211, 1215–17 (2011) 
2018] The Right of Confrontation in the U.S., Canada, and Europe 123 
questioned how a state of emergency, standing alone, can make a person’s 
statements to law enforcement nontestimonial.140  He stated: 
The lesson of the failed Roberts framework is that the confrontation 
right needs to be protected with doctrine that reflects confrontation 
values.  Courts should heed that lesson when interpreting and applying 
the Davis decision.  Assessing simply whether an “emergency” existed 
while a person described potentially criminal events does not 
meaningfully help determine whether introducing the person’s 
statement in a criminal trial would make the person a “witness” against 
the defendant.  Nor does examining any questioner’s primary purpose 
in eliciting such an out-of-court statement materially assist in that 
inquiry.141 
The Court has also been criticized for its expansive reading of the criterion of 
emergency statements, under which any conceivable purpose for an interview 
can be construed as non-interrogation, resulting in statements that fall outside of 
the Confrontation Clause.142  One commentator has criticized the Bryant Court 
for following such an approach, noting that the Court “manipulate[d] the facts 
and law arbitrarily so as to achieve [these] results.”143 
                                                 
(referring to Justice Sotomayor’s application of Davis and Crawford in Michigan v. Bryant, 562 
U.S. 344 (2011), as a “scattershot approach”).  The Court’s focus on the declarant’s intentions 
alongside those of the interrogator in determining if statements are testimonial has been recently 
criticized by Professor David Noll.  Professor Noll commented that “a test that turns on awareness” 
that one’s statements could be used in a subsequent criminal trial, particularly given the liberal 
definition of relevant evidence contained in the federal rules, “does not meaningfully constrain the 
universe of statements subject to the Confrontation clause.”  Noll, supra note 76, at 1958. He argues 
that the focus should be on constitutional harm.  Id. at 1966. 
 140. Jeffrey L. Fisher, What Happened—and What Is Happening—to the Confrontation 
Clause, 15 J. L. & POL’Y 587, 613 (2007). 
 141. Id. at 626–27. 
 142. Id. at 609–14. 
 143. Madden, supra note 137, at 415–16 (analogizing Jules Epstein, Cross-Examination: 
Seemingly Ubiquitous, Purportedly Omnipotent, and “At Risk”, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 427, 441–42 
(2009)).  Criticizing the majority’s decision in Bryant, Justice Scalia excoriated the majority’s 
impact on confrontation clause jurisprudence as “leav[ing] it in a shambles.”  Michigan v. Bryant, 
562 U.S. 344, 380 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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In short, the Court’s post-Crawford jurisprudence has been described as a 
“train wreck,”144 a “debacle,”145 a “mess,”146 and as “highly subjective, fact-
intensive, [and] malleable.”147  Professor David Noll commented, “[o]ne of the 
most notable developments in contemporary constitutional law is the breakdown 
of jurisprudence interpreting the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause 
following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Crawford v. 
Washington.”148 
These weaknesses and flaws are readily apparent in the Clark opinion.149  The 
Court’s fact-intensive primary purpose test and the corresponding ongoing-
emergency concept provide an avenue for courts to manipulate the facts to 
achieve their desired result.  In Clark, the Court ignored relevant facts and 
contorted precedent in concluding that an ongoing emergency existed at the time 
the teachers questioned L.P. at school.150  The fact that L.P. was at school and 
separated from his alleged abuser at the time of the questioning is significant,151 
                                                 
 144. Daniel D. Blinka, More “Bullcoming”? The Court Courts Confusion in Confrontation, 
MARQ. U. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (Mar. 3, 2011), https://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/author/daniel-
blinka/page/2/, quoted in Kevin C. McMunigal, Crawford, Confrontation, and Mental States, 64 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 219, 220 (2014) (“Commentators describe the Crawford line of cases as 
‘incoherent,’ ‘uncertain,’ ‘unpredictable,’ ‘a train wreck,’ ‘suffering from “vagueness” and 
“double-speak,”‘ and, simply put, a ‘mess.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 145. George Fisher, The Crawford Debacle, 113 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 17, 17 
n.a1 (2014) (attributing the term to Eileen A. Scallen, Coping with Crawford: Confrontation of 
Children and Other Challenging Witnesses, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1558 (2009)). 
 146. Deborah Ahrens & John Mitchell, Don’t Blame Crawford or Bryant: The Confrontation 
Clause Mess Is All Davis’s Fault, 39 RUTGERS L. REC. 104, 105 (2012). 
 147. Michael D. Cicchini, Dead Again: The Latest Demise of the Confrontation Clause, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1302 (2011). 
 148. Noll, supra note 76, at 1899. 
 149. See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015).  As previously discussed, a foundational error 
in the Court’s doctrine is its focus on assessing whether the statements were testimonial in nature 
at the time they were made.  People do not become witnesses within the context of the 
Confrontation Clause at the time they make an out-of-court statement.  Instead, they become 
witnesses under the Sixth Amendment when they testify at a trial, hearing, or deposition, or when 
their statements are introduced into evidence at a trial.  See supra notes 139–43 and accompanying 
text.  Professor Jeffrey Fisher recognized this distinction and said of the “ongoing emergency” 
inquiry: “[T]he presence of an ongoing emergency is important only insofar as it indicates that a 
declarant’s statement describing criminal activity can fairly be described as part of the event itself, 
rather than a report or a narrative of it.”  Fisher, supra note 140, at 614. 
 150. Justice Alito failed to define the suspected child abuse against L.P. as falling within the 
context of domestic violence, and in doing so, he ignored the distinctions Justice Sotomayor set out 
for domestic violence cases in Bryant.  In Bryant, the Court indicated that the duration of 
emergencies rested on when the threat was neutralized, adding that emergencies within the 
domestic violence context “often have a narrower zone of potential victims than cases involving 
threats to public safety” and exist only while there is “a continuing threat to them.”  Compare Clark, 
135 S. Ct. at 2181, with Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 363–64 (2011). 
 151. The Court supports its finding that an ongoing emergency existed by distinguishing these 
facts from Hammon, stating that in that case “the police knew the identity of the assailant and 
questioned the victim after shielding her from potential harm.”  Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181.  However, 
in Clark, the teachers learned the identity of the assailant during the course of their questioning.  Id. 
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as are the facts that L.P.’s injuries did not compel the teachers to seek immediate 
medical care, and that Clark did not pose a threat to the public at large.152  Most 
importantly, the fact that L.P. left school that day in Clark’s custody refutes the 
notion that an ongoing emergency existed.153 
Furthermore, the primary purpose test, which requires a court to find only one 
purpose for the interrogation when other equally important purposes are present, 
provides a court the opportunity to choose the purpose it prefers, and thus the 
outcome it desires.154  In finding that the teacher’s primary purpose was to care 
for L.P.,155 the Court dismissed the fact that the teachers were mandated 
reporters and, as such, knew or should have known that any statements they 
elicited from L.P. could ultimately be used in a criminal prosecution.156 
B.  The Law in Canada 
Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter), enacted 
as part of the Constitution Act of 1982, guarantees everyone “the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except 
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”157  Additionally, 
section 11(d) provides: “Any person charged with an offence has the right to be 
                                                 
at 2178.  Once again deviating from precedent, the Clark Court failed to consider that a 
conversation can “evolve into testimonial statements.” See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 
(2006).  Thus, under these facts, the argument could be made that even if the questioning began as 
a non-testimonial statement, once L.P. identified Clark as the assailant—who was not present at 
that time—the conversation evolved into a testimonial statement.  Compare Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 
2181, with Bryant, 562 U.S. at 365, and Davis, 547 U.S. at 830. 
 152. See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 364–65 (“The victim’s medical state also provides important 
context for first responders to judge the existence and magnitude of a continuing threat to the victim, 
themselves, and the public.”). 
 153. Although the Court acknowledged that the teachers and the social worker “were reluctant 
to release L.P. into Clark’s care,” the fact that neither the teachers nor the social worker ever felt 
the need to call the police after Clark’s alleged “stare-down” with the social worker and aggressive 
taking of L.P. contradicts the finding that this was an ongoing emergency.  See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 
2181 n.2. 
 154. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 155. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181 (“There is no indication that the primary purpose of the 
conversation was to gather evidence for Clark’s prosecution.  On the contrary, it is clear that the 
first objective was to protect L.P.”). 
 156. Although the Court mentioned the concept of reliability, it failed to adequately assess 
whether the L.P.’s statements were reliable, even though there were serious questions regarding the 
reliability of his statements for a variety of reasons.  L.P.’s statements were ambiguous and he gave 
several different reasons for his injuries during the course of the repeated questioning.  Id. at 2178.  
At the trial, one of the teachers acknowledged that she was not sure he understood what he was 
being asked.  See supra note 116 and accompanying text.  At the competency hearing held before 
the trial, he was unable to answer simple questions such as who his sister was, when his birthday 
was, where he went to school, or even whom he lived with.    It was these responses that caused the 
judge to remark only a few minutes into the questioning, “I’ve heard enough,” and declare him 
incompetent to testify.  Joint Appendix, supra note 116, at 4–12. 
 157. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter Canadian Charter]. 
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presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public 
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal[.]”158 
The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has stated that the right to a fair trial is 
the proper end to be achieved under section 7 and is one of the foundational 
principles of fundamental justice.159  However, unlike the Sixth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution, the Charter does not enumerate the right of confrontation.  
In fact, the SCC has recognized that the rights provided under section 7 do not 
include the right to confront or cross-examine witnesses.160  However, it has 
found that the right of an accused to make a full answer and defense to the 
charges against him is implied under section 7.161  It explained: 
The right to make full answer and defen[s]e manifests itself in several 
more specific rights and principles, such as the right to full and timely 
disclosure, . . . as well as various rights of cross-examination, among 
others.  The right is integrally linked to other principles of fundamental 
justice, such as the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial, 
and the principle against self-incrimination.162 
The SCC has also found that the principle of fundamental justice contained in 
section 7 encompasses not only individual rights but societal interests as well.163  
In R. v. Jarvis,164 for example, the SCC recognized the societal interest in the 
truth-seeking process.165  It elevated this societal interest to constitutional status 
by stating that the “principle of fundamental justice suggest[s] that relevant 
evidence should be available to the trier of fact in a search for truth.”166 
The SCC revolutionized the common law of evidence during the period of 
time that coincided with enactment of the Charter.167  This revolution has 
                                                 
 158. Id. § 11(d). 
 159. R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, para. 47 (Can.).  The SCC has also 
noted that the rights set forth in sections 8 through 14 of the Charter are “examples of the principles 
of fundamental justice” that are referenced in section 7.  Madden, supra note 137, at 418–19 (citing 
R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, 603). 
 160. Khelawon, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, para. 48. 
 161. R. v. Rose, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 262, para. 98 (Can.). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See, e.g., DAVID M. PACIOCCO & LEE STUESSER, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 4 (5th ed. 2008) 
(Can.). 
 164. R. v. Jarvis, 2002 SCC 73, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757 (Can.). 
 165. See PACIOCCO & STUESSER, supra note 163, at 4 (citing Jarvis, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757, para. 
68). 
 166. Jarvis, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757, para. 68. 
 167. See Hamish Stewart, Section 7 of the Charter and the Common Law Rules of Evidence, 
in 40 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW 415 (2d series, 2008) (Can.) (noting that the Charter became 
effective in April 1982, whereas the SCC’s evidence revolution began the next month with its 
decision in R. v. Vetrovec, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 811 (Can.) (eliminating the corroboration requirement 
for accomplice testimony)).  It has been argued that this flexible approach is actually more in line 
with the Charter because it affords increased protections to defendants.  Some scholars maintain 
that a strict interpretation of the rules of evidence would lead, in some circumstances, to the 
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brought significant changes to the Canadian law of evidence, the result of which 
has been a trend toward a more flexible approach to the admission of evidence 
at trial, replacing the traditional rigid approach under which the rules were 
strictly interpreted.168  The adoption of the flexible approach, which has come to 
be known as the “principled approach,” was motivated in part by the perceived 
need to improve the law as it related to the prosecution of sexual crimes.169  It 
was widely believed that a rigid interpretation of the rules resulted in the 
exclusion of valuable evidence and the acquittal of “clearly guilty” persons.170  
Significant changes in the law of evidence and criminal procedure were enacted 
in response to this perceived need, including the removal of corroboration 
requirements in most instances, the modification of standards for the 
competence of witnesses, and the relaxation of the hearsay rule.171  Professors 
Paciocco and Stuesser suggest that the trend toward more liberal admissibility 
rules and the adoption of the principled approach can also be attributed, in part, 
to the decreasing use of juries; juries hear only a small percentage of criminal 
cases in Canada and are rarely used in civil cases.172 
In addition to the rationale discussed above, there was growing dissatisfaction 
with the traditional rules related to the admissibility of hearsay in Canadian legal 
circles, which included the courts, legal scholars, law reform commissions, and 
the Federal/Provincial Task Force on the Law of Evidence.173  Despite this, 
proposed parliamentary reform in the 1980s failed.174  However, the SCC did 
not sit idly by, and in the early 1990s issued two decisions, R. v. Khan175 and R. 
v. Smith,176 which radically changed the approach that Canadian courts would 
take to determining the admissibility of hearsay evidence.177 
                                                 
exclusion of exculpatory evidence and to the admission of evidence that operates unfairly against 
defendants.  PACIOCCO & STUESSER, supra note 163, at 5. 
 168. PACIOCCO & STUESSER, supra note 163, at 5; see also Peter Sankoff, Rewriting the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Four Suggestions Designed to Promote a Fairer Trial 
and Evidentiary Process, in 40 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW 369 (2d series, 2008) (Can.) 
(commenting that “none of the Charter rights specifically target evidentiary concerns, and the 
absence of such a provision has prevented the Charter from having a major effect in this area”). 
 169. See PACIOCCO & STUESSER, supra note 163, at 5; see also Archibald, supra note 4, at 5. 
 170. Archibald, supra note 4, at 10. 
 171. PACIOCCO & STUESSER, supra note 163, at 5. 
 172. Id. at 5–7. 
 173. Archibald, supra note 4, at 2–4. 
 174. Id. at 4.  The attempt to reform the law of evidence came in the form of Bill S-33, entitled 
An Act to give effect, for Canada, to the Uniform Evidence Act adopted by the Uniform Law 
Conference of Canada.  Id. at 4 n.8. 
 175. R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531 (Can.). 
 176. R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915 (Can.). 
 177. See Archibald, supra note 4, at 4, n.9. 
128 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 67:105 
1.  R. v. Khan and R. v. Smith 
In R. v. Khan, a physician was on trial for sexually assaulting a three-year-old 
girl during a routine office visit.178  Shortly after leaving his office 
(approximately thirty minutes after the alleged assault), the child described the 
events to her mother.  The mother reported the assault to the police and the 
defendant was arrested and charged with sexual assault.179  The trial judge found 
that the child was not competent to testify and denied the prosecutor’s request 
to admit the child’s statements.180  Applying the common law rules of evidence, 
the court found the girl’s statements to her mother were inadmissible because 
they were not contemporaneous with the event.  The defendant was found not 
guilty.181 
The SCC agreed with the trial court’s ruling regarding the contemporaneous 
nature of the girl’s statements.182  However, Madam Justice McLachlin, writing 
for the court, stressed the need for increased flexibility in interpreting hearsay 
rules in cases involving sexual abuse of young children.183  She identified the 
two foundational principles of the law of evidence: necessity and reliability.184  
Incorporating these two principles, the SCC held that hearsay statements would 
be admissible provided the evidence is “reasonably necessary” and reliable.185  
The SCC set forth its new rule regarding children’s statements: 
[H]earsay evidence of a child’s statement on crimes committed against 
the child should be received, provided that the guarantees of necessity 
and reliability are met, subject to such safeguards as the judge may 
consider necessary and subject always to considerations affecting the 
weight that should be accorded to such evidence.186 
The SCC refused to provide a list of factors for courts to consider in 
determining if the evidence was reliable, explaining that the determination of 
reliability varies and should be left to the discretion of the trial judge.187  
However, the SCC noted that “considerations such as timing, demeanour, the 
personality of the child, the intelligence and understanding of the child, and the 
absence of any reason to expect fabrication in the statement” may be important 
in determining reliability.188 
                                                 
 178. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 533–34. 
 179. Id. at 534. 
 180. Id. at 535. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 540. 
 183. Id. at 542–44. 
 184. Id. at 542. 
 185. Id. at 546–47. 
 186. Id. at 548. 
 187. Id. at 547. 
 188. Id. 
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The SCC held that the mother’s statements should have been admitted because 
both the necessity and reliability requirements were met.  It found the statements 
were necessary because the child was found not competent to testify; they were 
reliable because the child had no reason to fabricate her story and because she 
made the statement “naturally and without prompting.”189  Furthermore, the SCC 
found the statements were reliable because a child of her age would ordinarily 
not possess knowledge of these types of sexual acts, and her statements were 
corroborated by physical evidence.190 
Two years later, the SCC decided R. v. Smith, a case involving statements 
made by a murder victim to her mother shortly before her murder.191  The SCC 
ruled that the principles that it previously set out in Khan were to be applied in 
all cases and not limited to cases of child abuse.192  It stated, “Hearsay evidence 
is now admissible on a principled basis, the governing principles being the 
reliability of the evidence, and its necessity.”193 
2.  R. v. Starr 
The SCC continued to develop the principled approach it established in Khan 
and Smith nearly a decade later in R. v. Starr.194  In Starr, the defendant was 
charged with two counts of first-degree murder following the shooting deaths of 
two victims.195  A key piece of evidence against the defendant was one of the 
victim’s statements to his girlfriend in which he stated that he was going to “go 
and do an Autopac scam with [the defendant].”196  The trial judge admitted the 
statement under the “present intentions” exception to the hearsay rule as proof 
that the victim and the defendant were together at the time of the killing.197 
The SCC vacated the defendant’s conviction and ordered a new trial.198  
Noting the relationship between the principled approach and traditional hearsay 
exceptions, it held that in cases where the traditional exceptions are at odds with 
the principled approach, the traditional exceptions must be revised in light of the 
                                                 
 189. Id. at 548. 
 190. Id. 
 191. R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915 (Can.). 
 192. Id. at 932 (“Khan should not be understood as turning on its particular facts, but, instead, 
must be seen as a particular expression of the fundamental principles that underlie the hearsay rule 
and the exceptions to it.”). 
 193. Id. at 933.  It provided guidance for courts in determining these required criteria.  
Reliability or “the circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness [] is a function of the circumstances 
under which the statement in question was made.”  Necessity, on the other hand, “refers to the 
necessity of the hearsay evidence to prove a fact in issue.”  The SCC also noted that necessity 
should be given a flexible definition “capable of encompassing diverse situations.”  Id. at 933–34. 
 194. R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144 (Can.). 
 195. Id. at 205, para. 103. 
 196. Id. at 208, para. 111. 
 197. Id. at 215, para. 132. 
 198. Id. at 269, para. 245. 
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principled approach.199  In other words, the principled approach governs the 
admission of hearsay evidence; thus, a hearsay statement that satisfies a 
traditional hearsay exception is no longer automatically admissible.200  It stated: 
In Khan, Smith, and subsequent cases, this Court allowed the 
admission of hearsay not fitting within an established exception where 
it was sufficiently reliable and necessary to address the traditional 
hearsay dangers.  However, this concern for reliability and necessity 
should be no less present when the hearsay is sought to be introduced 
under an established exception.  This is particularly true in the criminal 
context given the “fundamental principle of justice, protected by the 
Charter, that the innocent must not be convicted.”  It would 
compromise trial fairness, and raise the spectre of wrongful 
convictions, if the Crown is allowed to introduce unreliable hearsay 
against the accused, regardless of whether it happens to fall within an 
existing exception.201 
After determining that the challenged statement was in fact hearsay,202 the 
SCC found that the victim had a reason to lie to his girlfriend about his intentions 
at the time he made the statement.203  In finding that the statement was made 
under “circumstances of suspicion,” the SCC held that the statement did “not 
fall within the present intentions exception.”204  Therefore, in analyzing the 
statement under the principled approach, the “circumstances of suspicion” that 
surrounded the making of the statement rendered it unreliable.  The SCC added, 
“Having found that the statement is unreliable, it is unnecessary to go on to ask 
whether it was necessary or not.”205  Accordingly, the SCC concluded that the 
                                                 
 199. Id. at 250, para. 207 (“The more appropriate approach is to seek to derive the benefits of 
certainty, efficiency, and guidance that the [traditional hearsay] exceptions offer, while adding the 
benefits of fairness and logic that the principled approach provides.”). 
 200. Id. at 243, para. 192 (“[T]o the extent that the various exceptions may conflict with the 
requirements of a principled analysis, it is the principled analysis that should prevail.”). 
Hearsay evidence may only be admitted if it is necessary and reliable, and the traditional 
exceptions should be interpreted in a manner consistent with this requirement. 
In some rare cases, it may also be possible under the particular circumstances of a case 
for evidence clearly falling within an otherwise valid exception nonetheless not to meet 
the principled approach’s requirements of necessity and reliability.  In such a case, the 
evidence would be excluded. 
Id. at 253, paras. 213–14. 
 201. Id. at 247, para. 200 (quoting R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, para. 71 (Can.)). 
 202. Id. at 231, para. 167 (“It was an out-of-court statement, and it was offered by the Crown 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted; namely, that [the victim] intended to do an Autopac scam 
with [the defendant].”). 
 203. Id. at 237, para. 179 (“[The victim] may have had a motive to lie in order to make it seem 
that he was not romantically involved with [another woman], and . . . could point to the [defendant], 
who was sitting nearby in a car but out of earshot, as being the person with whom he was going to 
do a scam.”). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 251, para. 209. 
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statement should not have been admitted because it was “inadmissible under the 
principled approach” and “[did] not fall under an existing exception either.”206 
3.  R. v. Khelawon 
The SCC set out the procedure that courts should follow under the principled 
approach in its 2006 decision in R. v. Khelawon.207  This case involved 
statements made by Skupien, an elderly resident of a nursing home, to a 
caregiver,208 his physician,209 and ultimately in a videotaped interview with the 
police in which he reported that the defendant, the manager of a nursing home, 
had physically assaulted him.210  In the course of their investigation, the police 
interviewed several other residents of the home who also reported that the 
defendant had assaulted them.211  The defendant was convicted of assault 
following a trial in which Skupien’s hearsay statements, along with those of the 
other residents of the home, were admitted.212  The trial judge found the hearsay 
statements were reliable because of the “striking similarity” between Skupien’s 
statements and those of the other residents.213 
The SCC noted that the rationale for the use of the principled approach in 
criminal cases arises from section 7 of the Charter.214  It commented that 
although the adversary system is based on the assumption that the 
untrustworthiness of a witness’s statements is best brought to light through 
cross-examination, alongside the defendant’s right to make a full answer and 
defense is society’s interest in having a trial process that is designed to discover 
the truth.215  It engaged in a lengthy discussion of the hearsay rule and the 
challenges presented when attempting to determine the reliability of these types 
of statements in the absence of cross-examination.216  It preceded this discussion 
by setting out the then-current, governing framework: 
                                                 
 206. Id. 
 207. R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787 (Can.). 
 208. Id. at 797–98, paras. 11–13. 
 209. Id. at 799, para. 15. 
 210. Id. at 799, para. 16. 
 211. Id. at 800, para. 18. 
 212. Id. at 804, para. 28 (“At the conclusion of the trial, [the judge] ultimately found only two 
of the videotaped statements sufficiently credible to found a conviction . . . .”). 
 213. Id. at 804, para. 26. 
 214. Id. at 814, para. 47.  The Court stated: 
The concern over trial fairness is one of the paramount reasons for rationalizing the 
traditional hearsay exceptions in accordance with the principled approach.  As stated [in 
Starr] in respect of Crown evidence: “It would compromise trial fairness, and raise the 
spectre of wrongful convictions, if the Crown is allowed to introduce unreliable hearsay 
against the accused, regardless of whether it happens to fall within an existing exception.” 
Id. at 814, para. 47 (quoting R. v. Starr, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144, para. 200). 
 215. Id. at 814–15, para. 48. 
 216. Id. at 816–18, paras. 50–55. 
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(a) Hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible unless it falls 
under an exception to the hearsay rule.  The traditional exceptions to 
the hearsay rule remain presumptively in place. 
(b) A hearsay exception can be challenged to determine whether it is 
supported by indicia of necessity and reliability, required by the 
principled approach.  The exception can be modified as necessary to 
bring it into compliance. 
(c) In “rare cases,” evidence falling within an existing exception may 
be excluded because the indicia of necessity and reliability are lacking 
in the particular circumstances of the case. 
(d) If hearsay evidence does not fall under a hearsay exception, it may 
still be admitted if indicia of reliability and necessity are established 
on a voir dire.217 
The SCC next set out the procedures that courts should follow.  The trial 
judge, acting as the gatekeeper, must determine whether the principles of 
necessity and reliability have been established based on a balance of 
probabilities.218  It emphasized that it refused to create new categorical rules with 
regard to reliability, preferring that the principled approach be applied on a case-
by-case basis.219  Finally, it opined that the dangers raised by hearsay evidence 
can be overcome if one of two broad conditions are met: (1) the circumstances 
surrounding the making of the statement provide evidence of the reliability of 
the statement or tend to show that the statement is true; or (2) “adequate 
substitutes for testing the evidence” exist.220 
Applying this reasoning to the case before it, the SCC found little evidence to 
demonstrate that the statements were reliable.221  It noted that an appropriate 
exclusionary test asks whether “the evidence was unlikely to change under 
cross-examination,” and found that the test was not met because the 
                                                 
 217. Id. at 811–12, para. 42 (quoting R. v. Mapara, 2005 SCC 23, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 358, para. 
15). 
 218. Id. at 814, para. 47.  The SCC noted the distinction between “threshold reliability” and 
“ultimate reliability.”  Id. at 816, para. 50.  Threshold reliability is concerned with whether the 
statement provides “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” and is determined by the court, 
whereas ultimate reliability involves the question of whether or not the statement will be relied 
upon in deciding the issues involved in the case and is a matter for the fact finder to determine.  Id. 
at 816–17, paras. 51–52 (quoting Starr, [2000] 2 S.C.R. at paras. 215, 217). 
 219. Id. 813, para. 45. 
 220. Id. at 823, para. 66.  This factor has been found to be present in cases involving prior 
statements that witnesses made to police officers or at preliminary hearings when the declarants 
testified and were subject to cross examination at the trial.  See, e.g., R. v. B. (K.G.), [1993] 1 
S.C.R. 740 (Can.) (involving prior inconsistent statements); R. v. Hawkins, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1043, 
para. 76 (Can.) (finding that testimony given at a preliminary hearing, under oath, and subject to 
cross-examination satisfied the test for threshold reliability). 
 221. Khelawon, [2006] 2 S.C.R. at 842, para. 105–07 (“In order to meet the reliability 
requirement in this case, the Crown could only rely on the inherent trustworthiness of the statement.  
In my respectful view, there was no case to be made on that basis either.”). 
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circumstances surrounding Skupien’s statements raised serious concerns.  The 
declarant was old and frail, his medical records were replete with diagnoses of 
paranoia and dementia, and there was evidence in the medical records that his 
injuries could have been caused by a fall.222  Finally, the SCC indicated that 
although the existence of “striking similarities” between the statements of the 
witnesses could support a finding of reliability, the facts did not support this 
finding in the present case.223 
Moreover, the SCC did not find there was a sufficient substitute basis for 
testing Skupien’s statements because he died before the trial and was never 
cross-examined at any other hearing.224  It noted that there was nothing more 
than a police video of his interview stating, “[t]he principled exception to the 
hearsay rule does not provide a vehicle for founding a conviction on the basis of 
a police statement, videotaped or otherwise, without more.”225 
4.  Commentary on Canadian Jurisprudence 
Many view the principled approach as a major advancement in the Canadian 
law of evidence.226  Those who approve of this approach believe that the changes 
better serve the public interest because the approach results in “a greater reliance 
on the application of discretion at the expense of fixed rules, and more evidence 
being provided to the jury for consideration.”227  Supporters of the principled 
approach also cite its preference for flexible principles that require that evidence 
doctrines be framed and applied in a manner focused on the interests and values 
at stake in the specific evidence question.228  Professor Lisa Dufraimont has 
opined that the approach’s “consistent focus on the rationales behind the rules” 
has worked to assure that admissibility decisions are “more likely to further the 
law’s underlying policies.”229 
Although the principled approach has its supporters, it has also been criticized 
on a number of fronts.  First, although it was the “twin defects in the common 
law of evidence,” complexity and rigidity, that drove the revolution in Canadian 
                                                 
 222. Id. at 842–43, para. 107. 
 223. Id. at 844, para. 108. 
 224. Id. at 842, para. 106. 
 225. Id. at 842, para. 106. 
 226. See, e.g., Lisa Dufraimont, Realizing the Potential of the Principled Approach to 
Evidence, 39 QUEEN’S L.J. 11, 38 (2013) (Can.). 
 227. Sankoff, supra note 168, at 370 (“The move to a principled approach swept away 
outmoded concepts of proof that had become ‘preposterously rigid’ and simultaneously forced a 
reconsideration of the governing tenets of admissibility.”  (footnotes omitted)). 
 228. Id. at 369–70.  The author commented that flexibility and judicial discretion are the 
norm—describing the principled approach as “the triumph of a principled analysis over a set of 
ossified judicially created categories.”  Id. at 369 n.96 (quoting R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915, 
930 (Can.)). 
 229. Dufraimont, supra note 226, at 38. 
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law,230 only rigidity has been reduced entirely under the principled approach.231  
Initial expectations that the principled approach would address the complexity 
issue have not been fulfilled.  In fact, some evidence doctrines, particularly the 
hearsay rules, have grown in complexity.  Under the principled approach, 
hearsay may be admitted under an existing exception to the rule or on a case-by-
case basis upon a finding of necessity and reliability.232 
Since the adoption of the principled approach, the SCC has focused most of 
its attention on the reliability factor.233  The main emphasis in its reliability 
discourse has been on the circumstances surrounding the making of the out-of-
court statement.234  Although there are some prevailing factors,235 overall 
reliability remains a vague principle.  The factors that courts consider are 
numerous and undefined, causing one scholar to comment: “[T]he legal 
mechanisms for admitting hearsay are sometimes clumsy, sometimes too 
restrictive, and at other times not restrictive enough.  Consequently, we have a 
mess.”236  Likewise, Professor Bruce Archibald noted, “[t]he most significant 
controversy . . . over the reliability issue concerns corroboration of hearsay by 
                                                 
 230. Id. at 14.  The author suggests that Canadian common law hearsay rules developed ad hoc 
in response to “perceived problems in the process of proof.”  Id. at 18.  As a result, over time, these 
“rules and exceptions multiplied and their technical requirements proliferated.”  Id.; see also 
MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 11 (Yale U. Press ed. 1997) (“[The disheveled state 
of evidence law] is primarily attributable to the fact that common law evidentiary doctrine evolved 
ad hoc, cobbled up over time from judicial rulings in individual cases.”). 
 231. Dufraimont, supra note 226, at 38. 
 232. Id. at 23, 38 (“In other areas, most importantly the traditional exceptions to the hearsay 
rule, the courts have used the additive method of piling principles atop a complex set of rules.”). 
 233. See, e.g., R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, paras. 61–63 (Can.).  Judge 
Charron, writing in Khelawon, explained that “[s]ince the central underlying concern is the inability 
to test hearsay evidence, it follows that under the principled approach the reliability requirement is 
aimed at identifying those cases where this difficulty is sufficiently overcome to justify receiving 
the evidence as an exception to the general exclusionary rule.” Id. at 820, para. 61. 
 234. Archibald, supra note 4, at 33–34. 
 235. Among the circumstances cited by Canadian courts as an indication of reliability, the 
absence of a motive on the part of the declarant to lie is prominent.  Id. at 34.  The factors that have 
come to be identified as those relevant to the determination of reliability as set out by the Khelawon 
Court are: 
i.  the timing of the statement in relation to the event reported; 
ii. the absence of a motive to lie on the part of the declarant; 
iii. the presence or absence of leading questions or other forms of prompting; 
iv. the nature of the event reported; 
v. the likelihood of the declarant’s knowledge of the event, apart from its occurrence; 
and 
vi. confirmation of the event reported by physical evidence. 
R. v. J.M., 2010 CanLII 117 (Can. Ont. C.A.) 117, para. 54 (citing Khelawon, [2006] 2 S.C.R. at 
para. 67). 
 236. Timothy E. Moore, Distinguishing Reliability from Credibility: Children’s Hearsay 
Evidence in Canada, Address at the Society for Research in Child Development Biennial Meeting 
(Apr. 20, 2001), in Alan D. Gold Collection of Criminal Law Articles, ADGN/RP-113 (QL), para. 
3 (Can.). 
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evidence other than that found in the circumstances surrounding the making of 
the statement.”237  He criticizes the use of corroborating evidence to determine 
the reliability of the hearsay statements on grounds that, when the admission of 
hearsay evidence is sought, “each statement [should be] assessed for reliability 
in relation to hearsay dangers.”238  He argues that using corroborating evidence 
to determine the reliability of a hearsay statement is misplaced because “the 
further afield one goes in seeking reliability in corroborative evidence, the 
greater the dangers of a kind of ‘bootstrap’ approach, turning the principled 
exception into an inclusionary rule.”239  The principled approach has also been 
criticized because of its clear potential to increase indeterminacy.240  Professors 
David Paciocco and Lee Stuesser have noted: 
The movement to make the rules responsive to the needs of the 
particular case has not come without a cost.  Flexibility is being 
achieved at the expense of certainty.  The rules of evidence have never 
been easy to apply.  Yet many of those rules of evidence now require 
more detailed evaluation and produce less predictable results than ever 
before. 
 . . . . [A]ppellate courts sometimes try to elaborate on the vague 
formulae that have been adopted.  In the process, they provide more 
particularized criteria.  The precedential value in these decisions is 
slowly giving structure to the broad standards of admissibility that 
have been developed.  Some of the open-textured rules are beginning 
to operate much like the more rigid rules that they were designed to 
replace.241 
Ironically, the principled approach has been criticized as being unprincipled, 
due to what Professor Mike Madden sees as flawed reasoning supporting the 
required threshold reliability assessment.242  He criticizes the principled 
approach because it allows the admission of hearsay based solely on a trial 
judge’s determination of reliability without the benefit of testing the reliability 
of the evidence by cross-examination.243  Madden equates this approach with the 
                                                 
 237. Archibald, supra note 4, at 36. 
 238. Id. at 38. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Professor Dufraimont notes, “[s]ince the principled approach to evidence moves the law 
away from rigid rules that command specific outcomes toward broad principles that allow flexible, 
contextual application, it clearly carries the potential to increase indeterminacy.”  Dufraimont, 
supra note 226, at 17. 
 241. PACIOCCO & STUESSER, supra note 163, at 6. 
 242. Madden, supra note 137, at 429–30. 
 243. Professor Madden also notes that although the SCC stresses the importance of cross-
examination as the best means of assessing the truth, it also suggests that there are other equally 
effective means to test the reliability of the evidence.  He argues that this reasoning is disjointed 
since “cross-examination cannot logically and simultaneously be both ‘the best’ and ‘not the best’ 
means for testing evidence.”  Id. at 433.  He criticizes the SCC’s reasoning in Khan, in which it 
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flawed reasoning in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts, which 
was acknowledged by Justice Scalia in Crawford: “Dispensing with 
confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with 
jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.”244 
The principled approach has also been criticized because of what many view 
as its effect on the Charter’s guarantees of the right to a fair trial.  Professor 
Timothy Moore, noting the considerable uncertainty regarding the criteria under 
which reliability is to be determined, remarked: 
Predictability and uniformity are valuable and important elements of 
the justice system.  Without them, judicial discretion is given broad 
latitude, and individual cases end up being dependent on the 
idiosyncrasies of specific judicial decisions.  Uncertainty is not what 
we want if [victim’s] needs and defendant’s rights are to be properly 
protected.245 
Professor Kenneth Ehrenberg argues that the principled approach, with its 
movement toward judicial discretion and liberal admissibility of evidence, has 
costs that reformers never recognized.246  He further argues that it “sacrifices the 
promise that legal conclusions will be reached on a uniform standard of 
knowledge reproducible across cases.”247  He claims that  particularly in criminal 
trials, this subsequently “jeopardizes the promise of justice,” because such trials 
lack “uniform justificatory standards.”248 
Others argue that the principled approach affects a defendant’s right to a fair 
trial because a rigorous application of the hearsay rule, alongside the right to 
cross examination, promotes equality among the parties in the trial process and 
ensures that “prosecutorial power is kept in check by inhibiting the capacity of 
the state to use its superior resources to gather remote statements for use against 
a weaker accused.”249  Professor Peter Sankoff, referencing the growing body of 
scholarship surrounding the causes of wrongful convictions, suggests  that the 
principled approach, along with what he perceives as the corresponding trend 
                                                 
“assumed a statement to be reliable so that it could dispense with the need to actually establish the 
reliability of a statement through cross-examination.”  Id. at 432. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Moore, supra note 236, para 29. 
 246. Kenneth M. Ehrenberg, Less Evidence, Better Knowledge, 60 MCGILL L.J. 173, 176 
(2015) (Can.). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Archibald, supra note 4, at 24–25.  Other critics argue that the public credibility of 
verdicts in criminal cases is diminished under the principled approach because it “rests in 
considerable measure on the presentation of the incriminating evidence in open court,” where the 
opposing party is given a full opportunity to test the evidence through cross-examination.  Id. at 24. 
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toward “granting juries access to potentially prejudicial evidence[,] have been 
unwilling partners in heightening the risk of wrongful convictions.”250 
C.  The European Court of Human Rights 
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, later known as the European Convention on Human Rights (the 
Convention), became effective in 1953 after being signed and ratified by eight 
Western European countries.251  The Convention identifies numerous human 
rights, including life, liberty, freedom of expression, and the right to marry.252  
Article 6 of the Convention, entitled “[r]ight to a fair trial,” sets out the rights of 
defendants in criminal trials, which include the right to be informed of the 
“nature and cause of the accusations” against them and the right to free legal 
assistance “when the interests of justice so require.”253  Most importantly, 
Article 6(3)(d), patterned after the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
specifically sets forth a right of confrontation.  It provides that a criminal 
defendant has the right “to examine or have examined witnesses against him and 
to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the 
same conditions as witnesses against him.”254 
The Convention also established the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) with jurisdiction over “all matters concerning the interpretation and 
                                                 
 250. Sankoff, supra note 168, at 372.  He notes that studies have demonstrated that jailhouse 
informants, certain kinds of expert opinion evidence, and identification evidence, among others, 
have been identified as causes of wrongful convictions.  Id. 
 251. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), last amended by Protocol 
No. 14, June 1, 2010, C.E.T.S. No. 194, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf 
[hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].  Originally ratified by Denmark, Germany, 
Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, the Convention was 
established by the Council of Europe; for a brief discussion on the history and organization of the 
Convention, see Roger W. Kirst, Hearsay and the Right of Confrontation in the European Court of 
Human Rights, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 777, 779–82 (2003).  The forty-seven-member Council of 
Europe, which was established in 1949, is headquartered in Strasbourg, France, and “was set up to 
promote democracy and protect human rights and the rule of law in Europe.”  Do Not Get Confused, 
COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/do-not-get-confused (last visited Feb. 4, 
2018).  For a discussion on the history and organization of the Council of Europe, see Matthew J. 
Gabel, Council of Europe, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.britannica.com/topic 
/Council-of-Europe. 
 252. Section I of the Convention sets forth the “Rights and Freedoms” in articles two through 
twelve and include: the “Right to life”; the “Prohibition of torture”; the “Prohibition of slavery and 
forced labour”; the “Right to liberty and security”; the “Right to a fair trial”; “No punishment 
without law”; the “Right to respect for private and family life”; “Freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion”; “Freedom of expression”; “Freedom of assembly and association”; and the “Right to 
marry.”  European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 251. 
 253. Id. art. 6(3)(a), (c). 
 254. Id. art. 6(3)(d). 
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application of the Convention.”255  Member countries agree to accept and 
implement the decisions of the ECtHR.256 
1.  The Early Decisions 
Although the Convention became effective in 1953, it was not until some 
thirty years later, in 1986, that the ECtHR found that a criminal conviction based 
on hearsay violated Article 6(3) of the Convention.257  In Unterpertinger v. 
Austria, the defendant was convicted of assaulting his step-daughter and wife.258  
The police interviewed the victims and set out their statements in police 
reports.259  They did not testify at the trial, and in their absence, the trial court 
admitted the report into evidence.260  The ECtHR found that the admission of 
these reports at the defendant’s trial violated the Convention because the hearsay 
statements were the main bases for his conviction, and he  was not provided with 
an opportunity to cross-examine the declarants.261 
The ECtHR reached similar conclusions in subsequent cases.262  An important 
factor it considered in determining whether the admission of hearsay rendered a 
trial unfair was the probative value of the hearsay evidence weighed against 
                                                 
 255. Id. § II. 
 256. Id. art. 46(1).  The Court is organized into five sections, or administrative entities, and 
each section has a president, a vice president, and a judicial chamber.  Composition of the Court, 
EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/judges (last visited Feb. 
5, 2018).  The Grand Chamber of the Court is composed of seventeen judges, including the 
president and vice president of the court and the section presidents of each of the five sections, and 
hears only a small, select number of cases each year.  European Court of Human Rights, INT’L 
JUST. RES. CTR., http://www.ijrcenter.org/european-court-of-human-rights/#Structure (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2018).  Cases can be referred to the Grand Chamber in one of two ways: (1) on appeal from 
a Chamber decision; or (2) relinquished by a Chamber.  Id.; see also Kirst, Hearsay and the Right 
of Confrontation, supra note 251, at 777 (citing FRANCIS G. JACOBS & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 3–14 (2d ed. 1996)). 
 257. See Kirst, Hearsay and the Right of Confrontation, supra note 251, at 782–83. 
 258. Unterpertinger v. Austria, 110 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 3 (1986). 
 259. Id. at 3–4. 
 260. Id. at 6. 
 261. Id. at 11–12. 
 262. See, e.g., Barberà v. Spain, 146 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 31–32 (1989) (finding that the 
admission at trial of written statements made by a person in police custody accusing the defendant 
of murder violated the Convention where the witness was unavailable at trial).  Other cases were 
similarly decided.  See Bricmont v. Belgium, 158 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 24–26 (1989) (finding 
that victims’ unsworn statements made to the court, outside of defendant’s presence, violated the 
Convention).  The same reasoning was applied in a line of cases involving anonymous witnesses.  
In Kostovski v. Netherlands, and one year later in Windisch v. Austria, the ECtHR found that the 
use of anonymous witnesses foreclosed any opportunity for the defendants to ever confront those 
witnesses, either during the investigation or at any subsequent hearings, and therefore deprived the 
defendants of their right to a fair trial.  Kostovski v. Netherlands, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 16–
17 (1989); Windisch v. Austria, 186 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 8–9 (1990). 
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other evidence produced at trial.263  Therefore, a defendant’s right to a fair trial 
was not necessarily violated in cases where the conviction was based, in part, on 
hearsay statements, but not “to a decisive extent.”264 
In Kok v. Netherlands,265 a case involving an anonymous witness, the ECtHR 
found that the admission of the declarant’s unchallenged hearsay statements did 
not violate the Convention because there was “considerable alternative 
evidence” of defendant’s guilt.266  Likewise, in Verdam v. Netherlands,267 the 
ECtHR found that the admission of the hearsay statements of sexual assault 
victims did not violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial because the details in 
the hearsay statements were corroborated by other evidence.268 
Following the ECtHR’s 2001 decision in Luca v. Italy,269 the sole or decisive 
rule was treated as an absolute rule.270  In this case, the ECtHR found that the 
defendant’s conviction for distributing cocaine violated the Convention where it 
was based solely on hearsay statements of an individual who named the 
defendant as his source of the drugs.271  It stated: 
[W]here a conviction is based solely or to a decisive degree on 
depositions that have been made by a person whom the accused has 
                                                 
 263. See, e.g., Bricmont, 158 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 25 (“It must nonetheless be determined to what 
extent the Brussels Court of Appeal relied on the Prince’s [hearsay statement] in order to convict 
the applicants.”). 
 264. See Kostovski, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 17 (“The Convention does not preclude reliance, at 
the investigation stage of criminal proceedings, on sources such as anonymous informants.  
However, the subsequent use of anonymous statements as sufficient evidence to found a conviction 
. . . is a different matter.”). 
 265. 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 597. 
 266. Id. at 623–24. 
 267. Verdam v. Netherlands, No. 35253/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug., 31, 1999), http://hudoc.e 
chr.coe.int/eng?i=001-4748.  Additionally, in Ferranteli v. Italy, a case that involved confessions 
made by several of the defendant’s accomplices, the ECtHR found that the Convention was not 
violated despite “the impossibility of examining or having examined before his death . . . the 
prosecution’s witness,” because the appellate court “carried out a detailed analysis of the 
prosecution witness’s statements and found them to be corroborated by a series of other items of 
evidence.”  Ferranteli v. Itay, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 937, §§ 44–52. 
 268. Verdam, No. 35253/97 at 7; see also Isgrò v. Italy, 194-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 9–10 
(1989) (finding the defendant’s rights were not violated, even though the witness did not appear to 
testify at trial, because the defendant confronted the witness at a hearing before the investigating 
judge). 
 269. Luca v. Italy, 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 167. 
 270. See Bas de Wilde, A Fundamental Review of the ECHR Right to Examine Witnesses in 
Criminal Cases, 17 INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 157, 158 (2013) (U.K.) (“[I]f the defen[s]e could not 
examine a witness whose statement was the sole or decisive evidence of the charges, the ECtHR 
consistently found there to have been a breach of the right to examine witnesses.”).  These rules 
were also applied in child sexual abuse cases.  See P.S. v. Germany, No. 33900/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Dec. 20, 2001), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59996 (finding the Convention was violated 
by the admission of statements an eight-year-old student made to her mother and to police officers 
where the conviction was based to a decisive extent on the victim’s statements). 
 271. Luca, 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 179. 
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had no opportunity to examine or to have examined, whether during 
the investigation or at the trial, the rights of the defen[s]e are restricted 
to an extent that is incompatible with the guarantees provided by 
Article 6.272 
2.  The Fourth Chamber’s Decision in Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United 
Kingdom 
The Fourth Chamber’s opinion in Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United Kingdom273 
was one of the ECtHR’s first opportunities to review the United Kingdom’s 
(U.K.) recently enacted hearsay rules as they applied in criminal cases.274  The 
opinion addressed two separately filed cases that dealt with the same legal 
question.  In Al-Khawaja, the defendant complained that his trial for indecent 
assault was unfair because the English trial court admitted the statements made 
by the subsequently deceased victim to the police following the alleged 
assault.275  In Tahery, the defendant claimed that his trial for “wounding with 
intent to do grievous bodily harm” was tainted when the sole witness’s out-of-
court statements were admitted at trial.276 
Defendant Al-Khawaja was a rehabilitative medicine physician charged with 
two counts of indecent assault on two female patients who were under hypnosis 
at the time.277  One of the complainants, S.T., described the assault to the police 
a few months after the incident.  She died of unrelated causes before the trial, 
and even though there was no other direct evidence of the assault, the trial court 
allowed her statements to be admitted into evidence.278  Also admitted into 
evidence were the testimonies from other witnesses to whom S.T. had reported 
the assault and the testimony of  the second complainant whose description of 
her assault was similar to S.T.’s.279  At the close of the trial, the judge cautioned 
the jury about S.T.’s statements, noting: “[Y]ou have not seen her give evidence; 
you have not heard her give evidence; and you have not heard her evidence 
cross-examined [by applicant’s counsel], who would undoubtedly have had a 
number of questions to put to her.”280  Al-Khawaja was convicted by a 
unanimous jury.281 
                                                 
 272. Id. at 178. 
 273. Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United Kingdom, Nos. 26766/05 & 22228/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 
20, 2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-90781. 
 274. See id. at 7–8 (citing Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44, § 116 (Eng.)) (“The following 
legislative provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 were drafted as a means to tackle crime by 
providing special measures to protect witnesses . . . . The Act entered into force in April 2005.”). 
 275. Id. at 1, § 3. 
 276. Id. (“[Tahery] alleged that his trial . . . had been unfair because the statement of one 
witness who feared attending trial was read to the jury.”). 
 277. Id. at 2, § 8. 
 278. Id. at 2–3, §§ 8–9. 
 279. Id. at 3, § 10. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 3, § 12. 
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Defendant Tahery was engaged in a fight in which he allegedly stabbed his 
opponent three times in the back.282  The victim told police that he did not see 
the person who stabbed him.  Other witnesses present at the scene also denied 
seeing who stabbed the victim.  However, two days after the incident, one of the 
witnesses came forward and told police that he saw the defendant stab the 
victim.283  The witness did not appear at trial.  Nonetheless, the court allowed 
his statements to the police to be introduced into evidence.284 
The Fourth Chamber found that the U.K. violated the Convention because the 
hearsay statements in both Al-Khawaja and Tahery were the sole or decisive 
basis for each conviction.285  It rejected the government’s argument that that the 
sole or decisive rule was not an absolute rule.286  It also rejected the 
government’s argument that there were sufficient counterbalancing factors in 
both cases to overcome the prejudice to the defendants resulting from the 
admission of the untested hearsay.287  The Chamber acknowledged its history of 
considering whether the trial court’s use of hearsay included procedures to 
counterbalance the resulting difficulties on the defense, it “doubt[ed] whether 
any counterbalancing factors would be sufficient to justify the introduction in 
                                                 
 282. Id. at 4, § 18. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 5, §§ 19–20 (“The prosecution argued that under the [Criminal Justice Act] 2003 
that [the witness] was too fearful to attend trial before the jury and should qualify for special 
measures [exempting him from testifying at trial].”). 
 285. See id. at 16–17, §§ 43, 48. 
 286. Id. at 13, § 37. 
 287. Regarding defendant Al-Khawaja, the ECtHR rejected the government’s proffered 
counterbalancing factors as insufficient, which included: the fact that the trial judge gave a 
cautionary warning to the jury; the fact that inconsistencies between the victim’s hearsay statement 
and the testimony of corroborating witnesses could be explored on cross-examination; and the fact 
that the declarant’s credibility could be challenged by the defense were sufficient to overcome the 
prejudice to the defendant from admission of the statements.  Id. at 15, § 41.  It held: “Having 
considered these factors, the Court does not find any of them, taken alone or together, could 
counterbalance the prejudice to [Al-Khawaja] by admitting [the hearsay] statement.”  Id. at 15–16, 
§ 42.  Noting that the U.K.’s appellate court had found the “judge’s warning to the jury” as 
insufficient, the Chamber added, “[e]ven if it were not so, the Court is not persuaded that any more 
appropriate direction could effectively counterbalance the effect of an untested statement which 
was the only evidence against the applicant.”  Id.  In the case of defendant Tahery, the government’s 
proffered counterbalancing factors included: the fact that the trial judge considered alternative 
measures before admitting the hearsay; the fact that Tahery was free to challenge or rebut the 
statement by testifying himself or by calling other witnesses; and that the judge told the jury that 
the witness was absent from trial due to a fear of testifying not caused by Tahery.  Id. at 16, § 45.  
Nonetheless, the Chamber remained unpersuaded that those factors, “whether considered 
individually or cumulatively, would have ensured the fairness of the proceedings or 
counterbalanced the grave handicap to [Tahery] that arose from the admission of [the hearsay] 
statement.”  Id.  at 16–17, § 46.  It added that Tahery’s right to testify in his own defense “[could 
not] be said to counterbalance the loss of opportunity to see and have examined and cross-examined 
the only prosecution eye-witness against him.”  Id. 
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evidence of an untested statement which was the sole or decisive basis for the 
conviction of an applicant.”288 
The newly established Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UKSC)289 
declined to follow Al-Khawaja & Tahery in R. v. Horncastle,290 which was seen 
by many as a clear violation of the Convention.  In declining to follow Al-
Khawaja & Tahery, Lord Phillips, writing for the UKSC, noted that this 
presented a rare departure from the general rule that domestic courts should 
“take into account” the Strasbourg jurisprudence.291  However, he stated that in 
cases where a domestic court “has concerns as to whether a decision of the 
Strasbourg Court sufficiently appreciates or accommodates particular aspects of 
our domestic process.  In such circumstances it is open to the domestic court to 
decline to follow the Strasbourg decision . . . .”292 
                                                 
 288. Id. at 13, § 37. 
 289. Constitutional Reform Act 2005, c. 4, § 23 (U.K.).  The Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom commenced work in October 2009. The Supreme Court, CTS. & TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-justice-system/the-supreme-court (last visit 
ed Feb. 15, 2018). 
 290. R v. Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14 [108] (appeal taken from Eng.) (“In so concluding I 
have taken careful account of the Strasbourg jurisprudence.  I hope that in due course the Strasbourg 
Court may also take account of the reasons that have led me not to apply the sole or decisive test in 
this case.”). 
 291. Id. [11].  The Strasbourg jurisprudence, culminating in Al-Khawaja & Tahery, holds that 
Article 6 of the Convention is violated whenever a conviction is solely or decisively based on 
hearsay statements admitted into evidence.  Id. [7]. 
 292. Id. [11].  This case was decided eleven months after the Fourth Chamber’s Al-Khawaja 
& Tahery decision.  Horncastle involved two consolidated appeals.  In the first case, Horncastle 
and an accomplice “were convicted of causing grievous bodily harm, with intent,” to a man named 
Peter Rice.  Id. [2].  Rice’s statements to the police, in which he described his attackers, were 
admitted into evidence despite the fact that Rice was a registered alcoholic who admitted to drinking 
a substantial quantity of alcohol on the day of the attack.  R. v. Horncastle [2009] EWCA (Crim) 
964 [97].  In the second case, defendants Marquis and Graham were convicted of kidnapping a 
young woman named Hannah Miles.  The trial court admitted Miles’ statements regarding the 
alleged kidnapping—rather than compelling her to testify at trial—because the judge determined 
that “she was a witness in fear.”  Id. [125]–[133].  Lord Phillips, referencing the Criminal Justice 
Act of 2003, explained that English law contained numerous provisions designed to ensure that 
only reliable evidence would be admitted.  Horncastle [2009] UKSC [36] (citing Criminal Justice 
Act 2003, c. 44, §§ 124–126 (Eng.)).  He argued that although pretrial confrontations between 
witnesses and defendants can provide opportunities for confrontation in civil law countries, they 
are not practical in common law countries where police officers, not judicial officers, conduct the 
investigations.  Id. [61]–[62].  He also criticized the ECtHR’s sole or decisive rule for “produc[ing] 
a paradox,” in that it allows the introduction of evidence if it is peripheral, but not decisive.  Id. 
[91].  He further posited that courts will experience great difficulty applying the sole or decisive 
rule and, as such, the only proper way to deal with this rule is to exclude all hearsay evidence.  Id. 
[87], [90].  This case was ultimately appealed to the Fourth Chamber of the ECtHR.  Horncastle v. 
United Kingdom, No. 4184/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 16, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
148673. 
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3.  The Grand Chamber’s Decisions 
a.  Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United Kingdom 
The appeal from the Fourth Chamber’s decision in Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. 
United Kingdom to the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber was decided in December 
2011.293  The Grand Chamber began by explaining that the guarantees set forth 
in Article 6(3)(d) are “specific aspects of the right to a fair hearing” guaranteed 
under Article 6(1), and that the ECtHR’s primary concern under Article 6(1) is 
to assess the overall fairness of the proceedings.294  Furthermore, it set out a 
general principle for courts to follow: 
[B]efore an accused can be convicted, all evidence against him must 
normally be produced in his presence at a public hearing with a view 
to adversarial argument. . . . [T]he accused should be given an 
adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness 
against him, either when that witness makes his statement or at a later 
stage of proceedings.295 
 Noting that “inculpatory evidence against an accused may well be ‘designedly 
untruthful or simply erroneous,’” it stated: 
[U]nsworn statements by witnesses who cannot be examined often 
appear on their face to be cogent and compelling . . . . Experience 
shows that the reliability of evidence, including evidence which 
appears cogent and convincing, may look very different when 
subjected to a searching examination. . . . The Court’s assessment of 
whether a criminal trial has been fair cannot depend solely on whether 
the evidence against the accused appears prima facie to be reliable, if 
there are no means of challenging that evidence once it is admitted.296 
Despite this strong defense of the right of cross-examination, the Grand 
Chamber departed from its previous bright-line rule that the admission of sole 
or decisive, untested hearsay evidence violates Article 6.297  Instead, it held that 
the admission of sole or decisive hearsay evidence of absent witnesses “will not 
automatically result in a breach of Article 6(1).”298  In place of the bright-line 
rule, the ECtHR set out three factors for courts to consider: (1) “whether it was 
necessary to admit the witness statements” of an absent witness at trial; (2) 
whether the “untested [hearsay] evidence was the sole or decisive basis” for the 
conviction; and (3) whether “sufficient counterbalancing factors [existed] . . . to 
                                                 
 293. Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United Kingdom, 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 191. 
 294. Id. at 243–44, § 118. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 251, § 142 (quoting Kostovski v. Netherlands, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), § 42 
(1989)). 
 297. Id. at 252–53, § 146. 
 298. Id. at 253, § 147. 
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ensure that each trial, judged as a whole, was fair within the meaning of [the 
Convention].”299 
Applying this reasoning to the cases before it, the Grand Chamber found, like 
the Fourth Chamber before it, that the hearsay statements in both cases were the 
sole or decisive evidence against the defendants.300  However, in reversing the 
Fourth Chamber’s decision in Al-Khawaja, it found that that there were 
sufficient counterbalancing factors.301  The counterbalancing factors included: 
the fact that the victim’s complaints to her friends were shortly after the alleged 
incident; the fact that her recorded statements to police and her statements to her 
friends contained only minor inconsistencies; the fact that her friend’s testimony 
at trial was subject to cross examination; the strong similarities between her 
description of the alleged events and the testimony of the other complainant; and 
the fact that the jury was given the instruction to proceed with caution when 
considering the hearsay evidence. 302 
Conversely, the Grand Chamber upheld the Fourth Chamber’s decision in 
Tahery because it did not find sufficient counterbalancing factors.303  The 
government argued that the defendant was able to challenge the hearsay by 
“giving evidence himself or calling other witnesses who were present.”304  The 
court rejected this argument, noting: 
Even if he gave evidence denying the charge, [Tahery] was, of course, 
unable to test the truthfulness and reliability of [the witness’s 
statement] by means of cross-examination.  The fact is that [the 
witness] was the sole witness who was apparently willing or able to 
say what he had seen.  [Tahery] was not able to call any other witness 
to contradict the testimony provided in the hearsay statement.305 
                                                 
 299. Id. at 254, § 152. 
 300. Id. at 255–56, §§ 154, 160. 
 301. Id. at 256, § 158 (“[N]otwithstanding the difficulties caused to the defen[s]e by admitting 
the statement and the dangers in doing so, there were sufficient counterbalancing factors to 
conclude that the admission in evidence of S.T.’s statement did not result in a breach of [Article 6 
of the Convention].”). 
 302. Id. at 255, §§ 156–57. 
 303. Id. at 257, § 165. 
 304. Id. at 256, § 161. 
 305. Id. at 257, § 162.  The English courts continue to disagree with the ECtHR on this matter.  
A year after the Full Chamber’s decision in Al-Khawaja & Tahery, the English Court of Appeals 
(EWCA) decided R. v. Riat, an appeal that involved five consolidated cases.  R. v. Riat, [2012] 
EWCA (Crim) 1509 [1] (Eng.).  The EWCA addressed the relationship between the English rule 
as set forth in R. v. Horncastle and the ECtHR decision in Al Khawaja & Tahery.  It noted the 
following key principles: (1) English domestic law is—and must be accepted as is—set out in the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA 2003); (2) to the extent that the rulings in Horncastle and Al-
Khawaja & Tahery differ, English courts are to follow the Horncastle holding; and (3) English 
courts should ordinarily only be concerned with the CJA 2003 and the Horncastle decision.  Id. [2]. 
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b.  Schatschaschwili v. Germany 
The Grand Chamber handed down its most recent decision addressing the 
right of confrontation under Article 6 in December 2015.  In Schatschaschwili 
v. Germany,306 the ECtHR set out to clarify the position it announced in Al-
Khawaja & Tahery.  The facts of this case are as follows. 
On October 14, 2006, the defendant and an unidentified accomplice robbed 
two Lithuanian national women, L. and I., who were in Germany working as 
prostitutes.  The robbery occurred late in the evening at their apartment in 
Kassel, Germany.307  Four months later, in February 2007, the defendant and 
several other accomplices robbed O. and P., two Latvian nationals at their 
apartment in Göttingen, Germany.  These women were also working as 
prostitutes in Germany.308 
O. and P. reported the details of these events to their neighbor the following 
morning, then immediately left their apartment in Göttingen to stay for a few 
days with their friend L., one of the two women robbed approximately four 
months earlier.309  Upon arriving to L.’s home, just one day after the robbery 
occurred, O. and P. shared the details of their robbery with L., who subsequently 
reported it to the police.310  The police interviewed O. and P. about the robbery, 
during which time they told the police that they planned to return to Latvia.  
Anticipating their unavailability to testify at a subsequent trial, the prosecution 
asked the investigating judge to obtain statements from the victims that could 
later be used at trial.311 
The investigating judge questioned O. and P. at a hearing held on February 
19, 2007.  However, the defendant was not informed of this hearing because the 
judge feared the women would be afraid to tell the truth in the defendant’s 
presence.  The defendant was arrested in March 2007.312  Neither O. nor P. 
attended the trial; in their absence, the judge admitted their police interviews and 
the statements they made before the investigating judge.313  There was also other 
                                                 
 306. Schatschaschwili v. Germany, No. 9154/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 15, 2015), http://hudoc.ec 
hr.coe.int/eng?i=001-159566. 
 307. Id. at 3, §§ 12–13 (“The perpetrators were aware that the apartment was used for 
prostitution and expected its two female occupants to keep valuables and cash there.”). 
 308. Id. at 4, § 14. 
 309. Id. at 4, § 18. 
 310. Id. at 4–5, §§ 18–19. 
 311. Id. at 5, § 20. 
 312. Id. at 5, §§ 21–22 (“Witnesses O. and P. returned to Latvia shortly after that hearing.”). 
 313. Id. at 6–7, § 28. 
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evidence that corroborated their statements.314  The defendant was convicted of 
two counts of aggravated robbery and extortion.315 
The Grand Chamber began its assessment by setting out the three-step 
analysis it fashioned in Al-Khawaja & Tahery.316  Regarding the first factor—
whether there existed a good reason for the witness’s absence from trial—the 
Chamber held that the absence of a good reason is not in and of itself a violation 
of Article 6.317  Nonetheless, it noted that the lack of a good reason for the 
witness’s non-attendance at trial “is a very important factor to be weighed in the 
balance when assessing the overall fairness of a trial, and one which may tip the 
balance in favo[r] of finding a breach of Article 6 [ of the Convention].”318 
The Grand Chamber next turned to the second step in the analysis—whether 
the conviction was based solely or decisively on the evidence of the absent 
witness.319  It noted that the determination of whether the evidence is decisive 
turns on the relative strength of the other evidence, particularly the presence of 
corroborative evidence.320 
With respect to the third step in the analysis—whether there were sufficient 
counterbalancing factors—the Chamber identified several factors for courts to 
consider in making this determination.321  These included: the presence of 
corroborative evidence supporting the declarant’s statements;322 whether the 
                                                 
 314. The other evidence presented at trial included: the testimony of the neighbor to whom O. 
and P. had reported the robbery shortly after it occurred; the testimony of their friend L. to whom 
they also told about the robbery; information obtained from the defendant’s mobile phone; the GPS 
receiver from a co-accused’s car; the defendant’s admission that he had been in O. and P.’s 
apartment at the time of the robbery; and evidence showing similarities between the Kassel and 
Gottingen robberies.  Id. at 8–9, § 36. 
 315. Id. at 7, § 30. 
 316. Id. at 23–24, §§ 102–07.  The three steps in the analysis are: (1) whether a good reason 
existed for the absence of the witness at trial; (2) whether the conviction was solely or decisively 
based on the statement of the absent witness; and (3) whether sufficient counterbalancing factors 
existed “to compensate for the handicaps caused to the defen[s]e as a result of the admission of the 
untested evidence and to ensure that the trial, judged as a whole, was fair.”  Id. at 24, § 107 (citing 
Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United Kingdom, 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 191). 
 317. Id. at 26–27, § 113. 
 318. Id. 
 319. It commented that the term decisive “should be narrowly interpreted as indicating 
evidence of such significance or importance as is likely to be determinative of the outcome of the 
case.”  Id. at 26–27, § 113. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at 30–32, §§ 125–31.  The Grand Chamber stated that because a court must evaluate 
the overall fairness of the proceedings, it should assess the existence of sufficient counterbalancing 
factors in cases not only where the evidence is sole or decisive, but also where the evidence is found 
to “carr[y] significant weight and that its admission may have handicapped the defen[s]e.”  Id. at 
27–28, § 116. 
 322. This can include testimony at trial by persons to whom the declarant had reported the 
incident shortly after its occurrence, forensic evidence, expert opinions, and similar offenses 
committed by the defendant against others provided the witness testifies at trial and is subject to 
cross-examination.  Id. at 31–32, § 128. 
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defendant was provided the opportunity to question the witness during the 
investigation stage of the proceeding;323 and whether the trial court “approached 
the untested evidence of an absent witness with caution,” specifically, whether 
instructions given to the jury as to the weight it should give this evidence.324  
Under this analysis, corroborating evidence has a dual rule: assessing the 
probative value of the untested hearsay and determining the presence of 
sufficient counterbalancing factors. 
In applying the facts of the case before it, the ECtHR found the hearsay 
statements were decisive evidence in the conviction because O. and P. were the 
only eyewitnesses to the crime.325  Although corroborating evidence was 
presented at trial, including the testimony of O. and P.’s friend, L., and their 
neighbor, defendant’s admission that he had been at the scene of the crime at the 
relevant time and data recordings from cell phones and GPS systems, the Grand 
Chamber found that this evidence was “either just hearsay evidence or merely 
circumstantial technical and other evidence which was not conclusive as to the 
robbery and extortion.”326  
In determining whether there were sufficient counterbalancing factors to 
compensate for the admission of the hearsay evidence, the Grand Chamber 
found that the trial court’s failure to provide an opportunity for the defendant to 
question O. and P. during the pretrial proceedings was a serious error.327  It held 
that the counterbalancing measures taken by the lower court were insufficient to 
provide a “fair and proper assessment of the reliability of the untested evidence” 
because of the significant impact O. and P.’s statements had as the only 
eyewitnesses to the crime.328 
Although the Schatschaschwili Court followed the Al-Khawaja & Tahery 
rules, it reached a markedly different result when applying the rules to these 
facts.  The factors the Al-Khawja & Tajery Court relied on to conclude there 
were sufficient counterbalancing factors were also present in 
Schatschaschwili—specifically, the similarity of the victim’s statements to 
                                                 
 323. Id. at 32, § 130. 
 324. It added that another important consideration was whether the court provided detailed 
reasons for finding the evidence to be reliable.  Id. at 31, § 126. 
 325. Id. at 35, § 144. 
 326. Id.  The Chamber had already determined that there were good reasons for the witnesses’ 
absence at trial and that the trial court had made reasonable efforts to procure their attendance.  Id. 
at 34, §§ 139–40. 
 327. See id. at 38–39, 156–60.  It stated: 
[W]hile Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention concerns the cross-examination of 
prosecution witnesses at the trial itself, the way in which the prosecution witnesses’ 
questioning at the investigation stage was conducted attains considerable importance for, 
and is likely to prejudice, the fairness of the trial itself where key witnesses cannot be 
heard by the trial court and the evidence as obtained at the investigation stage is therefore 
introduced directly into the trial. 
Id. at 38, § 156 (citation omitted). 
 328. Id. at 39, § 163. 
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friends and her recorded statements to police; the opportunity to cross-examine 
the friends at trial; and the similarity between this crime and another one the 
defendant was accused of committing were also present in Schatschaschwili.  In 
this case, however, the court appeared to focus solely on the inability of the 
defendant to question O. and P. prior to trial in finding that the defendant was 
denied the right to a fair trial.329  This appears to signal a swing back from the 
Grand Chamber’s previous position and a renewed focus on the prior right to 
confrontation. 
4.  Commentary on the ECtHR’s Jurisprudence 
Under the Grand Chamber’s decision in Al-Khawaja & Tahery, to determine 
whether the admission of hearsay statements of a non-attending witnesses 
violates Article 6 of the Convention, three key questions must be addressed: (1) 
was there a good reason for the non-attendance of the witness; (2) was the 
evidence the sole or decisive evidence against the accused; and (3) if the 
evidence was the sole or decisive evidence against the defendant, were there 
sufficient counterbalancing factors to compensate for the prejudice to the 
defendant resulting from the admission of the untested hearsay?330  Those who 
favor this approach have argued for a narrowing of the sole or decisive rule, 
suggesting that the word “decisive” should be interpreted so that it would include 
only evidence so significant that it was likely to be outcome determinative.331 
Many are critical of the Grand Chamber’s opinion in Al-Khawaja & Tahery 
and the fact that it drastically changed its prior position by abandoning the sole 
or decisive evidence rule that had been consistently applied since the 2001 Luca 
v. Italy decision.332  In their joint opinion, partly dissenting and partly concurring 
in the Al-Khawaja & Tahery decision, Judges Sajó and Karakaş argued that the 
Convention does not provide grounds for restricting defense rights.333  They 
strongly disagreed with the majority’s position that the common law system can 
                                                 
 329. The Grand Chamber particularly took issue with the fact that the absence of the witnesses 
was foreseeable to the prosecution, such that it formed the basis for obtaining the statement.  The 
Chamber held: “Where the investigating authorities took the reasonable view that the witness 
concerned would not be examined at the hearing of the trial court, it is essential for the defen[s]e 
to have been given the opportunity to put questions to the witness at the investigation stage.”  Id. 
at 38, § 153 (citation omitted). 
 330. See Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United Kingdom, 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 191. 
 331. See, e.g., de Wilde, supra note 270, at 163; see also Al-Khawaja & Tahery, 2011-VI Eur. 
Ct. H.R. at 263 n.1 (Sajó & Karakaş, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“In our view, 
‘decisive’  evidence is reasonably taken to mean evidence without which the prosecuting authorities 
could not bring a case.”). 
 332. Hoyano, supra note 1, at 6. 
 333. Al-Khawaja & Tahery, 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 263–73 (Sajó & Karakaş, JJ., dissenting 
in part and concurring in part). 
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be trusted to assess the reliability of evidence absent confrontation.334  They 
criticized the majority for replacing the previous bright-line rule that was 
“intended to protect human rights against the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’” with 
the “uncertainties of counterbalancing.”335 
Professor Liz Heffernan commented that the sole or decisive evidence rule 
and the sufficient counterbalancing factors test “lead us into the complex and 
potentially fraught terrain of the significance of the contested evidence: its 
relationship with the other items of evidence and its strategic importance in the 
prosecutorial arsenal.”336  She notes that the ECtHR’s resurgence of rules 
allowing corroborating evidence to determine the admissibility of hearsay 
“bucks a general trend away from identifying and evaluating the strength of 
independent supportive evidence.”337 
She finds a “befuddling interplay” between evaluating the strength of the 
evidence for purposes of the sole or decisive rule and evaluating corroborative 
evidence as a potential counterbalancing factor.  Although the ECtHR sets these 
out as distinct lines of inquiry, Professor Heffernan explains that in practice they 
will operate as “flip-sides of the same coin.”338  The greater degree of 
decisiveness of the evidence, the less likely that corroborating evidence will be 
present; on the other hand, the stronger the corroboration, the less likely it will 
be that the initial evidence is decisive.339  Professor Heffernan concludes that the 
ECtHR’s confrontation right remains in a state of considerable uncertainty and 
predicts “continued critical reflection on the disputed wisdom of the ECtHR’s 
doctrinal compromise embodied in its recent jurisprudence . . . . It invites 
renewed focus on our contemporary understanding of fairness in systems of 
criminal justice and the role of the ECtHR in ensuring its protection.”340 
Professor Laura Hoyano is one of the harshest critics of the Grand Chamber’s 
Al-Khawaja & Tahery decision and its directional shift.  She criticizes the 
ECtHR for abandoning the sole or decisive rule and finds its balancing approach 
as “fundamentally misconceived, reflecting a profound misunderstanding of the 
right to a fair trial.”341  Pointing to the plain language of Article 6, she 
emphasizes that nothing in the language indicates that the right to a fair trial is 
                                                 
 334. Id. at 267 (Sajó and Karakas, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“Even 
experienced trial judges may erroneously give undue weight to evidence by witnesses whom the 
defen[s]e has not cross-examined.”). 
 335. Id. at 264–65, 273 (Sajó and Karakas, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part) 
(“[T]he [ECtHR] has systematically and consistently drawn a bright line, which it has never 
abandoned, in the form of the sole or decisive rule.  Today this last line of protection of the right to 
defen[s]e is being abandoned in the name of an overall examination of fairness.”). 
 336. Liz Heffernan, Calibrating the Right to Confrontation, 20 INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 103, 
108 (2016) (U.K.). 
 337. Id. at 109. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. at 110. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Hoyano, supra note 1, at 6. 
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subject to balancing or qualification.342  She adds that Al-Khawaja & Tahery 
severs the nexus between the sole or decisive rule and the Article 6(3)(d) right 
to challenge prosecutorial evidence, “by suggesting that the rule has no 
application where the evidence can be demonstrated by the prosecution to be 
reliable.”343 
She further criticizes the ECtHR’s shift from considering counterbalancing 
factors that were procedural in nature, which were designed to assist defendants 
in “overcoming the disadvantage caused by the incursion into the minimum 
right” contained in Article 6(3)(d), to an approach that includes the use of 
corroborating substantive evidence as a counterbalancing factor to the use of 
hearsay.  She questions the new approach, which allows additional inculpatory 
evidence to be used as a counterbalancing factor that establishes the reliability 
of the hearsay statements, asking, “[h]ow can other evidence further loading the 
prosecution’s pan on the scales of justice counterbalance the disadvantage to the 
defen[s]e of being deprived of the right to challenge the decisive evidence?”344 
Finally, she argues that the use of untested hearsay shifts the “equality of arms 
institutionali[z]ed in common law and civil law systems” and which serves to 
prevent a party from operating at a “substantial disadvantage” against their 
opponent.345  She comments that allowing the prosecution to proffer hearsay as 
a cornerstone of its case when the defense is not allowed the opportunity to 
directly challenge the source of the evidence inevitably results in an unfair trial.  
She concludes: “When this process of testing is wholly absent and pertains to 
the decisive evidence upon which the conviction rests, then the essence of the 
defe[s]e right to contest the prosecution case has evaporated, and so too has the 
right to a fair trial.”346 
III.  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE THREE JURISDICTIONS 
A.  Foundational Principles 
The following section identifies and compares the foundational principles and 
significant factors in the United States, Canada, and ECtHR’s confrontation 
jurisprudence.  It includes an analysis of how the key cases in each jurisdiction 
would likely be decided if they were brought in each of the other two 
jurisdictions. 
1.  Constitutional Protections and Other Enumerated Rights 
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 6(3)(d) of the 
Convention both contain an enumerated right of confrontation.  Canadian 
                                                 
 342. Id. at 10. 
 343. Id. at 20. 
 344. Id. at 22. 
 345. Id. at 23. 
 346. Id. at 24. 
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citizens, however, are not afforded this protection as the Canadian Charter does 
not contain this explicit right.347  Although the Supreme Court of Canada 
recognizes that an accused has an implied right to make a full defense under 
section 7 of the Charter, it has noted that this does not specifically include the 
right to confrontation.348 
The right to a fair trial is the overriding foundational principle repeatedly 
recognized in the opinions of the Canadian courts and the ECtHR.  In 
determining the admissibility of hearsay evidence, Canadian courts evaluate the 
concepts of necessity and reliability within the context of the entire trial, seeking 
to assure the overall fairness of the trial.349  Similar considerations are present in 
the ECtHR’s opinions, which repeatedly state that the right to confrontation is 
not an independent right, but rather one that is encompassed in the right to a fair 
trial contained in Article 6.350  Conversely, the right to a fair trial is not addressed 
in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause decisions, where there is little 
discussion of how the admissibility of hearsay impacts the overall fairness of the 
trial.  The Court’s approach since Crawford is a narrow one in which it limits its 
analysis to determining whether the hearsay statements are testimonial in 
nature.351 
2.  Reliability 
In Crawford, the U.S. Supreme Court abandoned the concept of reliability as 
the basis for assessing whether a defendant’s constitutional rights had been 
violated by the admission of untested hearsay statements.352  Further, although 
reliability has been mentioned in both Bryant and Clark, it was obiter dictum in 
both cases.353  On the contrary, reliability—alongside necessity—is the 
cornerstone of the Canadian principled approach and the primary focus of the 
                                                 
 347. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VI, and European Convention on Human Rights, supra 
note 251, art. 6, with Canadian Charter, supra note 157. 
 348. See Archibald, supra note 4, at 39–40. 
 349. See id. at 8–9 (explaining that Canadian hearsay jurisprudence, though facially concerned 
with necessity and reliability, is primarily aimed at ensuring fairness in criminal trials). 
 350. See Heffernan, supra note 336, at 104 (stating that confrontation is “a core value in the 
fair trial rights tradition of the EC[t]HR inasmuch as Article 6(3)(d) lists among the ‘minimum 
rights’ to which a criminal accused is entitled the right ‘to examine or have examined witnesses 
against him’”). 
 351. See discussion supra Sections II.A.2–6. 
 352. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004).  Writing for the majority in Crawford, 
Justice Scalia noted: 
Reliability is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept.  There are countless 
factors bearing on whether a statement is reliable . . . . Whether a statement is deemed 
reliable depends heavily on which factors the judge considers and how much weight he 
accords each of them.  Some courts wind up attaching the same significance to opposite 
facts. 
Id. at 63. 
 353. See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2179–80 (2015); Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 
352–54 (2011). 
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Canadian Supreme Court’s opinions.354  The ECtHR’s approach lies somewhere 
between those of the United States and Canada.  The Grand Chamber’s opinion 
in Al-Khawaja & Tahery, with its emphasis on the presence of corroborating 
evidence as an essential element in determining counterbalancing factors, makes 
it clear that assessing the reliability of the statements, although not central in its 
analysis, will be an important consideration in determining whether untested 
hearsay should be admissible.355 
3.  Necessity 
The first prong of the Canadian principled approach is necessity, where an 
important consideration is the “unavailability of a witness’s courtroom 
testimony.”356  However, necessity is not limited to witness unavailability.  The 
Canadian concept of necessity is founded on “the need to get at the truth,” and 
therefore, it is given a flexible meaning consistent with the philosophy 
underlying the principled approach.357  Together these considerations have 
contributed to judicial findings of necessity in cases where hearsay evidence was 
the sole evidence introduced against the defendant.358 
On the other hand, in the United States and in the ECtHR, necessity is only 
relevant to the concept of witness unavailability.  In the United States, 
unavailability is a foundational requirement for the admission of testimonial 
statements under Crawford and its progeny.359  Similarly, in the ECtHR, the 
proponent of the hearsay evidence is required to demonstrate that there was a 
good reason for the absence of the witness from the trial.360 
                                                 
 354. See Archibald, supra note 4, at 5. 
 355. See discussion supra Section II.C.3.a. 
 356. PACIOCCO & STUESSER, supra note 163, at 120. 
 357. Id.; accord Archibald, supra note 4, at 26–27. 
 358. Professor Archibald has observed an expansive approach to reasonable necessity 
following the adoption of the principled approach.  He argues that this is due to three factors: 
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rooted in adversarial due process concerns.”  Id. at 32–33. 
 359. See McMunigal, supra note 144, at 220–21 (discussing how testimonial statements are 
only admissible in a criminal trial if the witness is unavailable to testify at trial and the defense had 
a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness). 
 360. See Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United Kingdom, 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 191, at 244, § 120 
(“The requirement that there be a good reason for admitting the evidence of an absent witness is a 
preliminary question which must be examined before any consideration is given as to whether that 
evidence was sole or decisive.”). 
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4.  The Probative Value of the Evidence 
Under Canada’s principled approach, significant evidence only available 
through untested hearsay statements will be admitted upon a judicial finding that 
it is reasonably necessary to do so.361  Therefore, the greater the need for the 
evidence at trial, the more likely the scales will tip in favor of admission.  There 
is a marked difference on this issue between the Canadian approach and the 
ECtHR approach, where the strength of the evidence is a major consideration in 
applying the ECtHR’s sole or decisive evidence rule.  Under this doctrine, and 
in contrast to the principled approach, the stronger the evidence is, the more 
likely it will be found to be the sole or decisive basis for the conviction, and 
therefore, will not be admitted in the absence of significant counterbalancing 
factors.362  On the other hand, the strength of the untested evidence is of no 
significance in a trial court’s decision to admit evidence in the United States.363 
5.  The Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Statement 
The facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the statement are a 
highly significant factor in the United States and Canada for very different 
reasons, and are of no relevance to the ECtHR.  Canadian courts must make a 
threshold determination of reliability based on the facts and circumstances at 
play at the time the statement was made.364  Likewise, the facts and 
circumstances existing when statement was made are relevant in the United 
States.365  However, they are not relevant in determining whether the statements 
are reliable; they are only relevant in determining whether the hearsay statement 
is testimonial in nature.  Under Crawford and its progeny, courts determine the 
primary purpose of the statement based on an objective assessment of the 
declarant’s and the interrogator’s intentions at the time the statement was made 
and whether there was an ongoing emergency at that time.366 
6.  Alternative Means of Testing the Hearsay Evidence 
A central inquiry in the ECtHR’s right to confrontation doctrine is whether 
there are alternative means of testing the hearsay, other than cross-examination 
at trial.  Of particular importance in cases involving absent witnesses, is whether 
                                                 
 361. See Archibald, supra note 4, at 27. 
 362. See discussion supra Section II.C.3.a. 
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there was an opportunity for cross-examination during the pre-trial stage of 
proceedings.  However, with the Grand Chamber’s decision in Al-Khawaja & 
Tahery, the ECtHR effectively shifted from a focus purely procedural in nature 
to one that also considered substantive evidence.367  Yet, in Schatschaschwili, 
the ECtHR appeared to move back to its previous focus on procedural factors.368  
It based this decision solely on the fact that the defendant had not been afforded 
a prior opportunity to cross examine the witnesses’ statements during the 
investigative hearing, even though there was corroborating evidence supporting 
their statements.369 
Another critical factor in U.S. jurisprudence is whether there are other means 
of testing the evidence beyond the trial itself.  Testimonial statements are only 
admissible at trial if the defendant was afforded a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.370  In contrast, early Canadian cases had a singular focus on 
assessing the reliability of the statements through an examination of the facts 
and circumstances existing at the time the statements were made.  However, in 
more recent cases, Canadian courts have noted the importance of procedural 
safeguards and the opportunities afforded defendants for cross-examination.371 
7.  Uniformity 
The Canadian principled approach was designed to be applied on a case-by-
case basis; thus, by definition, it produces inconsistent decisions.  On the 
contrary, courts in the United States and the ECtHR, both of which adhere to the 
long-established doctrine of stare decisis, have attempted to establish rules 
designed to be applied uniformly.  Even so, decisions within each of these 
jurisdictions cannot be easily reconciled because the determination in the United 
States of whether statements are testimonial, and findings by the ECtHR that 
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 370. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. 
 371. See discussion supra Section II.B. 
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there are sufficient counterbalancing factors, are highly fact-specific inquiries.  
Additionally, recent trends in these jurisdictions have lessened the differences 
between them. 
Recent decisions of the ECtHR, with its movement away from the previous 
bright-line “sole or decisive” rule, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s fact-specific 
inquiry into the “primary purpose” of an interrogation, have resulted in 
conflicting decisions.372  Meanwhile, Canadian appellate courts have begun to 
provide more particularized criteria for assessing reliability, which is resulting 
in more uniform decisions.  However, some have noticed that this is unwittingly 
creating doctrine that is beginning to replicate the rigid rules the principled 
approach was designed to replace.373 
B.  Case Comparisons and Outcome Predictions 
The following section contains a prediction of how the key cases in each 
jurisdiction would be decided if they were brought in the other two jurisdictions. 
1.  Ohio v. Clark 
The young boy’s statements to his teachers would likely not be admissible if 
this trial were to take place in Canada.  L.P.’s statements would not be admissible 
under the traditional Canadian hearsay rules, because like the young girl in 
Khan, his statements were not contemporaneous with the event.  Finding that the 
statements would not be admissible under an established hearsay exception, 
Canadian courts would then assess the admissibility under the principled 
approach.374  Although L.P.’s statements would be found reasonably necessary, 
they are not reliable. 
The admission of L.P.’s statements at trial would be found reasonably 
necessary on two grounds: (1) because L.P. will not be found competent to 
testify at the trial;375 and (2) because they are needed to ascertain the truth—in 
other words, they are a critical piece of evidence identifying the defendant as his 
abuser.  However, as mentioned above, it is unlikely that a Canadian court would 
find the statements to his teachers to be reliable, based on a review of the facts 
                                                 
 372. Two areas where American courts have produced conflicting opinions are autopsy reports 
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and circumstances surrounding the making of the statements.  First, he did not 
make the statement naturally and without prompting, a key factor cited by the 
Khan Court.376  Second, he did not appear to understand the teachers’ questions 
or how to respond to them.  Third, he gave a variety of different responses to 
these questions and to the questions asked by the state’s child welfare worker.  
Based on this, it is likely that he would fail the Khelawon test—whether the 
declarant’s statements would change on cross-examination. 
Furthermore, although Khelawon allows the use of corroborating evidence to 
establish reliability, corroborating evidence in the form of physical evidence of 
his injuries would not serve to corroborate L.P.’s statements because he merely 
identified the perpetrator, without describing how these injuries occurred.  
Finally, the other evidence that was produced at trial, rather than supporting the 
reliability of L.P.’s statement identifying Clark as his abuser, suggests a different 
conclusion.  The fact that L.P.’s mother had her parental rights to three previous 
children terminated due to abuse and neglect, L.P. was in her custody the day 
before his teachers noticed his injuries, and she refused to return to Ohio from 
Washington after the social worker informed her that doctors and the police were 
involved all suggest that L.P.’s mother may have been responsible for his 
injuries. 
Like the Canadian courts, the ECtHR would likely find that L.P.’s statements 
should not have been admitted at Clark’s trial.  Applying the three prong test set 
out in Al-Khawaja & Tahery: (1) whether there was a good reason for the 
absence of the witness at trial; (2) whether the evidence of the witness was the 
sole or decisive basis for the conviction; and (3) whether there were sufficient 
counterbalancing factors to overcome the prejudice to the defendant resulting 
from the admission of untested hearsay, the ECtHR would likely conclude that 
admission of the statements violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial under 
Article 6 of the Convention.377 
With respect to the first two elements, there undoubtedly existed a good 
reason for L.P.’s absence from trial—he was not competent to testify.  
Furthermore, Clark’s conviction clearly was based solely or decisively on the 
admission of L.P.’s statements naming him as the perpetrator.  In fact, the 
prosecutor repeatedly referred to L.P.’s statements in his closing argument, and 
the Ohio Supreme Court found that admission of these statements was reversible 
error, which required finding that the error affected the outcome of the trial.  
Additionally, there does not appear to be any other significant evidence that 
would diminish the effect of these statements. 
As to Al-Khawaja & Tahery’s third element, the ECtHR would likely 
conclude that there were not sufficient counterbalancing factors present in this 
case to overcome the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the admission of 
these untested hearsay statements.  In making this determination, the ECtHR 
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would first assess the reliability of the statements, which will be determined 
principally by the existence of corroborating evidence.  As previously noted, 
although medical evidence was presented as to L.P.’s physical injuries, the 
evidence was pertinent only to the type of injuries he suffered.  It did not support 
the conclusion that Clark inflicted the injuries.  As to the other factors relevant 
to the ECtHR’s analysis, it does not appear that the trial judge gave cautionary 
instructions to the jury regarding these statements, nor was there a prior 
opportunity for the defendant to test L.P.’s statements at or before the trial. 
2.  Schatschaschwili v. Germany 
U.S. courts would likely reach the same conclusion as the ECtHR and find 
that the women’s statements should not have been admitted at trial.  Like Sylvia 
Crawford’s statements in Crawford v. Washington, L. and O.’s statements would 
be found to be testimonial because they were given at a formal police 
interrogation, as well as at a hearing before an investigating judge.  Under 
Crawford, these testimonial statements can only be admitted if the witnesses 
were unavailable378—which they were since they had left Germany and refused 
to return for the trial—and if the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.  In this case, the defendant was not afforded this opportunity for 
cross-examination, since the German investigating judge refused to provide the 
defendant with notice of the hearing. 
In contrast, it appears likely that these statements would be admissible in 
Canada even though the defendant did not have an opportunity to challenge the 
evidence.  The hearsay statements would be necessary since the witnesses were 
unavailable at trial.  Furthermore, applying factors identified in Khewalon, it is 
likely that the statements would be found to be reliable on several grounds.379  
The women did not appear to have a motive to lie.  As the victims, they had 
personal knowledge of the events surrounding the robbery.  There was also 
corroborating evidence to support their statements, including the testimony of 
their friends and neighbor to whom they had relayed the details of the robbery; 
the defendant’s admissions that he had been in their apartment; and the data and 
recordings from the cell phone and GPS system. 
3.  R. v. Khelawon 
Unlike the Canadian courts, courts in the United States are not required to 
assess the reliability of the statements the alleged victim made to his caregiver, 
his physician, or to the police in which he identified the manager of the nursing 
home as his abuser.  Therefore, assuming these statements would not fit within 
an exception to the hearsay rules, only the videotaped statements that he made 
to the police would be found to be testimonial and therefore not admissible at 
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trial.380  Conversely, the other statements would not be testimonial because, 
under Davis and Bryant, an objective declarant in his position would not think 
that the statements made to his caregiver or to his physician would likely be used 
in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 
In contrast, the ECtHR would likely find that admission of his statements 
violated the Convention.  First, they would be considered sole or decisive 
evidence because his statements appear to be the only evidence identifying the 
defendant as the perpetrator.  Second, these untested statements would violate 
the Convention because there does not appear to be sufficient counterbalancing 
factors present in this case.  Moreover, although there were other nursing home 
residents who similarly claimed that the defendant had abused them, which was 
a factor the Al-Khawaja & Tahery Court found significant, the very same facts 
were not found to constitute a sufficient counterbalancing factor in the recent 
Schatschaschwili decision.  Rather, the ECtHR found the more important 
consideration to be the fact that there was no opportunity for the defendant to 
cross-examine the victim who was the only eyewitness to the events.  The same 
is true in this case, Khelawon had no opportunity to cross-examine the only 
eyewitness since the elderly declarant died before the trial. 
C.  The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Doctrines 
In criminal trials, the state’s interest in the successful prosecution of criminal 
offenses and the corresponding need for evidence stands alongside the need to 
assure a level playing field in which a defendant’s right to challenge the evidence 
is of paramount importance.  The three distinct confrontation doctrines that have 
developed in the United States, Canada, and the European Court of Human 
Rights, along with the changes that each of these doctrines have undergone in 
the previous two decades, reflect the difficulties courts encounter as they 
struggle to balance the competing interests at stake.  This final section addresses 
the strengths and weaknesses of each of these approaches and ends with a brief 
discussion of what the U.S. Supreme Court can learn from these other 
jurisdictions. 
Canadian courts adopted the principled approach to the admission of hearsay 
statements in the 1990s in response to a perceived need to improve the 
prosecutions of sexual offenses.  The result was a doctrine that courts apply on 
a case-by-case basis with the focus placed on the dual elements of necessity and 
reliability.381  One strength of the principled approach is its requirement of 
necessity.  Hearsay statements should not be admissible in criminal trials unless 
it can be clearly demonstrated that the declarant is unavailable to testify at the 
trial. 
However, the principled approach has two significant flaws.  The first is the 
case-by-case approach, under which the doctrine of stare decisis carries little 
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legal weight in a court’s determination regarding the admission of evidence.  The 
resulting lack of uniform justificatory standards has serious deleterious effects 
on a defendant’s right to a fair trial. 
The second significant weakness of the principled approach is the importance 
that reliability plays in the decision to admit untested hearsay evidence along 
with the use of corroborating evidence as indicia of reliability.  It is interesting 
to note that Canadian courts adopted this approach at a time when it was being 
seriously questioned in the United States—Ohio v. Roberts focus on reliability 
as the key factor in determining the admissibility of hearsay evidence—and that 
would be abandoned by the U.S. Supreme Court a little over a decade later, on 
grounds that it failed to adequately protect a defendant’s rights. 
The serious flaws associated with the reliability approach have been 
recognized by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR and the U.S. Supreme Court 
alike.  These particular quotes were previously introduced in this Article, but 
warrant repeating here.  The ECtHR noted: 
Experience shows that the reliability of evidence, including evidence 
which appears cogent and convincing, may look very different when 
subjected to a searching examination. . . . The Court’s assessment of 
whether a criminal trial has been fair cannot depend solely on whether 
the evidence against the accused appears prima facie to be reliable, if 
there are no means of challenging that evidence once it is admitted.382 
Additionally, Justice Scalia fittingly posited the following: “Dispensing with 
confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with 
a jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.”383 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence too has 
important strengths and considerable weaknesses.  With Crawford, the Court 
correctly moved from a reliability-based approach, to one intended to protect the 
enumerated right to confrontation plainly set out in the Sixth Amendment.  
Further, the Court’s bright-line rule—that the Constitution demands 
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination—stems directly 
from the plain language of the Amendment.  However, in the cases following 
Crawford, the Court has struggled to produce legal doctrine consistent with these 
principles.  The Court’s sole focus on determining whether a hearsay statement 
is testimonial, along with its associated primary purpose test, is seriously 
defective for the reasons previously addressed in this Article.384  The principle 
defect of the testimonial doctrine is the foundational premise that a statement 
becomes “testimony” at the time it is made, rather than the point in time at which 
the evidence is proffered at trial. 
Like Canada and the United States, the doctrine developed by the European 
Court of Human Rights has its strengths, but also has important weaknesses.  In 
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its early decisions, the ECtHR practiced a strict interpretation of Article 6 of the 
Convention and employed a bright-line rule.  It consistently held that if the 
untested hearsay evidence was found to be the sole or decisive evidence against 
the defendant at trial, the admission of this evidence in criminal trials violated a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial under Article 6, unless the witness was shown to 
be unavailable to testify at trial and there had been a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.385 
There is much to be said for bright-line rules, particularly because they result 
in predictable and uniform jurisprudence.  However, courts are tempted to—and 
frequently will—detour from these rules principally in cases involving 
vulnerable victims.  In recent cases, the ECtHR altered its position in what 
appears to be a response to the harsh criticism directed at it from the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom following the Fourth Chamber’s decision in Al-
Khajawa & Tahery. 
In departing from its bright-line rule, the Grand Chamber modified the rules 
to allow for the admission of untested hearsay that is the sole or decisive 
evidence against the defendant if there are “sufficient counterbalancing factors” 
to overcome the prejudice to the defendant from the admission of this 
evidence.386  The fact that a witness might not be available would not, standing 
alone, prohibit the admission of the statements.  Additionally, the ECtHR 
introduced the notion that corroborating evidence should be taken into account 
in the determination of whether the hearsay is the sole or decisive evidence.  
Finally, regarding the issue of whether there are sufficient counterbalancing 
factors, corroborating evidence should be considered among the other evidence 
that a court looks to in resolving the question.387 
With that said, a significant strength of the ECtHR’s doctrine remains its focus 
on the strength of the proffered evidence.388  The UKSC was highly critical of 
using the sole or decisive rule as the dispositive factor, commenting that it is 
difficult to make this determination at the beginning of a trial,389 but this 
argument is wrong.  Judges, including common law judges, are more than 
capable of assessing the strength of a particular piece of evidence at the 
beginning of, or during, a trial.390  In fact, the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence 
recognize this and require the judge to function as a gatekeeper, and in this 
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regard, mandate judges to make many decisions affecting the admissibility of 
evidence that require this type of evaluative assessment.391 
The ECtHR has been soundly criticized, and rightly so, for its use of 
corroborating evidence.  As noted previously, Professor Heffernan criticizes the 
ECtHR for using corroborating evidence as both a factor in the determination of 
the sole or decisive evidence and as a factor in evaluating the sufficient 
counterbalancing factors; she correctly notes that they are “flip-sides of the same 
coin.”392  Under this approach, the stronger the corroborating evidence, the less 
likely the hearsay will be found sole or decisive, resulting in the admission of 
the evidence.  The other side of the coin shows that the stronger the corroborative 
evidence, the more likely the court will find sufficient counterbalancing factors 
that support admission.393  The opposite is also true: the weaker the 
corroborative evidence, the more likely the hearsay evidence will be sole or 
decisive, and the less likely that the court will find sufficient counterbalancing 
factors.  Therefore, the use of corroborative evidence as a counterbalancing 
factor appears meaningless since it has no effect on the overall analysis. 
Conversely, there are two important factors that the ECtHR includes in 
determining counterbalancing factors.  The first factor is whether the defense 
had a prior opportunity to question the unavailable hearsay declarant.  It is 
important to note the marked differences in the Grand Chamber’s opinions in 
Al-Khawaja & Tahery and Schatschaschwili—what appears to be a shift away 
from the ECtHR’s use of corroborative evidence and a renewed emphasis on the 
ability to cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses.394  The second important 
counterbalancing factor is whether the trial court approached the question of 
untested evidence with caution, specifically whether the judge provided 
adequate instructions to the jury as to the weight that should be assigned to this 
evidence.395 
There are some important lessons that the U.S. Supreme Court can take from 
these other jurisdictions.  First, like Canada and the ECtHR, the Court should 
retain the unavailability requirement and admit untested hearsay only upon a 
showing by the prosecutor that the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial. 
Second, the Court should abandon its recent attempts to reintroduce reliability 
into its Confrontation Clause doctrine.  In Crawford, the Court correctly 
separated the constitutional questions from the evidence issues when it 
abrogated the rule from Ohio v. Roberts.  These should remain independent 
issues especially because confrontation is a right enumerated in the Sixth 
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Amendment.  Furthermore, a reliability approach fails to provide adequate 
protections to defendants for the reasons previously addressed in this Article.  
The use of corroborating evidence to support the reliability of untested hearsay 
is fraught with a myriad of issues. 
The Court should move from its current singular focus on the primary purpose 
test.  As noted previously,396 this jurisprudence has become a “debacle,” a 
“mess,” “highly subjective, fact-intensive,” and “malleable” and no longer 
adequately protects defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights.  A modified version 
of the ECtHR’s doctrine could be adopted in its place.  Adopting the sole or 
decisive evidence rule eliminates the current arbitrary decision-making 
regarding whether a person is a “witness” at the time he or she makes a 
statement.  In its place would be a rule predicated on the understanding that the 
hearsay is testimony when it is proffered at the trial.  With this understanding, 
the focus of the inquiry is placed first on assessing the strength of the evidence.  
Courts, along with the parties involved, need only be concerned about evidence 
that is likely to result in a defendant’s conviction. 
However, unlike ECtHR’s current test, the rule put forth should include only 
procedural safeguards as counterbalancing factors, with the critical question 
being whether the defendant was ever afforded an opportunity to question the 
witness.  The right to confrontation is a procedural right that should not be 
diminished by the substantive evidence present in the case.  Although criminal 
pre-trial procedures in the United States generally do not include the type of 
judicial investigatory hearings found in many civil law European countries, it is 
possible to preserve testimony by affording the defendant an opportunity to 
question a witness at a pre-trial deposition.  In cases involving vulnerable 
witnesses, or where law enforcement fears a witness will not be available at the 
time of trial, courts can make use of pre-trial depositions, which can provide 
defendants an opportunity to question the witness.  As Professor Hoyano noted, 
“[t]he right to a fair trial is also an inconvenient right.”397  So too is the 
enumerated right to confrontation set out in the Sixth Amendment.  Enforcing 
these rights will sometimes result in the exclusion of hearsay statements where 
a defendant was not afforded an opportunity to challenge the evidence. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Three distinct confrontation doctrines have developed in the United States, 
Canada, and the European Court of Human Rights as courts in these jurisdictions 
have struggled to balance the state’s interest in the prosecution of criminal 
offenses with the need to protect a defendant’s right to challenge the evidence 
presented at trial.  The U.S. Supreme Court abandoned its previous reliability 
approach over twenty years ago because it found the test, in the words of Justice 
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Scalia, to be an “amorphous, if not entirely subjective concept.”398  However, its 
replacement—the testimonial statement approach—has proven to be not only 
illogical, but indeed turned out to be an amorphous, if not entirely subjective 
concept that fails to adequately protect a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation. 
The Canadian principled approach, with its case-by-case assessment of the 
reliability of evidence, is also deeply flawed.  The principled approach fails to 
provide sufficient guarantees of predictability and uniformity, essential elements 
of a criminal justice system, which puts the promise of justice contained in the 
Charter’s right to a fair trial at risk. 
Of the three approaches, the doctrine established by the ECtHR best protects 
an accused’s right not to have untested evidence from non-attending witnesses 
admitted at trial.  Although the ECtHR has been criticized recently for 
abandoning its bright-line sole or decisive evidence rule, this approach is still 
favored over the Canadian and U.S. doctrines because it requires an evaluation 
of the strength of the evidence, which properly recognizes the amount of 
prejudice a defendant will experience from the admission of the untested 
evidence.  Furthermore, this approach also requires a court to examine the 
procedural measures that the trial court put in place to offset the prejudice 
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